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FOREWORD
We Americans like to think of ourselves as a peace-loving people. We believe that our record in world politics supports this
view of ourselves. We cite our persistent efforts to make a success
of the United Nations as evidence of our naturally pacific disposition.
Unfortunately a love of peace does not automatically ensure the
success of peace-making and peace-keeping institutions. It.is always necessary for those who form the institutions to choose
proper means to the desired end. One of the basic problems in
making a success of the United Nations is that of its membership.
Should every independent state be admitted to the Organization?
Specifically, should states which have not always seemed to be
peace-loving, or have not been independent long enough to show
their true character, be admitted to membership?
These questions are urgent. The failure of the victorious powers
in World War II to agree upon peace treaties with their principal
opponents has left the peace itself incomplete and precarious.
Should Germany, or the two Germanies, be admitted to the United
Nations? And what government, or governments, should represent
China, or the two Chinas, in the Organization? And what also of
the numerous new and untried states which are springing from
obsolete colonial empires now in full course of liquidation? These
questions need to be answered before other basic problems, notably that of the role which the United Nations should play in
contemporary world politics, can be satisfactorily solved. And
these other problems are also urgent.
Recent critics of the United Nations, including some leading
supporters of the proposition that the world needs a general international organization for peace-making and peace-keeping purposes, question its suitability in its present form for all the work
that is required of it. One asserts that the world needs also an
independent concert of free nations to undertake pressing tasks
which he believes to be beyond the capacity of the United Na-

tions. Another suggests that too much reliance on the United Nations invites disappointment and that great powers, seeking adequate protection for their national interests in this frightening
age, should make greater use of other international agencies and
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of the processes of conventional diplomacy. Still other.s contend
that judgment cannot properly be passed on the performance of
an intended general international organization which falls as far
short of universality as does the United Nations / in its present
form. These supporters of the proposition that the world needs
an efficient international peace-making and peace-keeping organization insist that the present crisis calls first for a vigorous
effort to strengthen the United Nations by making it as soon as
possible a truly universal organization.
The worldwide discussion of the two hundred million dollar
bond issue, authorized at the Sixteenth Session of the General
Assembly, has caused thoughtful people everywhere to take a
hard look at the United Nations Organization and make a fresh
appraisal of its practical utility under the rapidly changing conditions of world politics. The task of appraisal is complicated by
the unexpected way in which the Organization ·h as developed.
Instead of a consensus of the major powers, which through their
permanent membership in the Security Council were to supply
leadership in world politics, there is the Cold War. Instead of a
return to normality after World War II there is the liquidation
of colonial empires. Instead of a comforting system of collective
security there is the arms race and the darkening shadow of a
third world war.
On the other hand, the United Nations Organization has been
unexpectedly serviceable in developing and using new processes
of peaceful change in this rapidly changing world. This unexpected serviceability has been particularly important in connection with threats to the peace growing out of the liquidation of
colonial empires, a major political phenomenon in the post-war
period. If the possibility of peaceful change be a necessary prerequisite for peace itself, as may well be believed under the
exigent circumstances of this troubled age, every effort should ·be
made to improve the capability of the United Nations to serve
in this way. We showed in our Fourteenth Report, dealing with
the role of the Secretariat in world politics, how important it is
to maintain this capability of the Secretariat, and especially of
the Secretary-General, for mediation and conciliation in international disputes. We now think, as this Fifteenth Report shows,
that a truly· universal United Nations would be capable of serving
even more effectively as an agency for international mediation

and conciliation.
The inclusion of effective spokesmen for all the world's peoples
in the general international organization will not only expand the
existin'g facilities for multilateral diplomacy within the framework
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of the United Nations. It will also maXImIze the possibility of
peaceful changes in the world. The Organization cannot be made
universal without at the same time disposing of some of the
gravest threats to the world's peace. The failure of the major
powers to finish the task of peace-making imposed upon them
by their success in World War II has permitted these threats to
hang over mankind too long. It is time to find out by trying what
can be done through the United Nations to fill this noxious void.
The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace sees no
reason for losing faith in the purposes and principles embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations or for relaxing efforts to make
the Organization a more effective servant of these purposes in
accordance with these principles. There is much that can be
done without waiting for a Charter Review Conference, as we
have shown in previous reports, to strengthen the United Nations
and improve the organization of peace in this difficult age. The
time has now come when the most urgent task for those who
believe in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter
is to complete the unfinished work of the World War II peacemakers by making the United Nations a universal organization.
How can the United Nations be expected to accomplish its mission in this troubled world when a quarter of the world's people
are excluded from it or not effectively represented in it? If the
peace is to be kept, it must first be made.
Some readers of the following study in the organization of
peace may deplore the lack of specific proposals for the solution
of some of the outstanding peace-making problems. We do not
suggest, for instance, any particular solution of the German problem nor even terms for solving the apparently lesser problem of
Berlin. It should be said here that the prescription of conditions
upon which peace might be made in any particular area is not
our present purpose. Weare concerned in this Report with the
development of a peace-making and peace-keeping process which
we believe will produce results that should be acceptable to all
who wish to promote the establishment of a reign of law in international affairs.
The proper development of this process calls for a universal
United Nations. The steps which should be taken toward this end
now are the topics of this Report. Finishing the transformation
of the United Nations from a military alliance of the victors in
the Second World War into a general and complete international

organization is a necessary means for the further strengthening
of the organization of the world's peace.
This Report has been prepared in accordance with our usual
practice. Our Executive Committee determined its scope and
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method and timing. A special Drafting Committee prepared a
first draft of the text, which was carefully reviewed by the Executive Committee and further revised. Other members of the Commission have contributed helpful advice and drafting assistance.
The Report's recommendations are approved by those Commission
members whose names are attached at the end. Reservations by
some members are duly noted. We are greatly indebted to the
Fontenay Corporation of New York for financial assistance in the
preparation of this Report, for which we express our thanks.

ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, Chairman
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace
June 1962
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A UNIVERSAL UNITED NATIONS
I. Need for a Universal United Nations
The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace has always
believed that the United Nations should be an organization with
a universal membership. In our Fourth Report, published in 1943,
we expressed the opinion that "the erection of a universal structure of law and order" had become a matter of practical politics.
Our program for immediate action began with the proposition that
uthe United Nations and their associates should proceed now to
establish the general international organization. It should provide
for eventual participation by all nations capable of fulfilling their
responsibilities." (See our Fourth Report, uFundamentals,~~ p.25. )
Capacity to fulfill the responsibilities of membership was the only
qualification specified in our original plan for admission to the
permanent United Nations Organization.
The justification of this program was a matter to which the
members of our Commission had given much thought. The real
difficulty in erecting a universal structure of law and order, we
then believed, does not lie in any fundamental disagreement
among thoughtful people as to what such an organization should
be like. It lies in the doubt as to whether the nations of the world
today are ready and willing to accept the responsibility of membership in an international system which secures peace by denying
the eldest attribute of sovereignty, the right to go to war." We
knew that it was idle to erect a system unless it would work, and
that political organizations do not work, or at least work badly,
unless they are supported by mutual confidence and good will. We
recognized that the then Axis Powers were not qualified for an
immediate part in a general international organization: to secure
the peace.
We were clear in our own minds, however, that a permanent
United Nations Organization must eventually be a universal organization. ~~Any plan for world organization is destined to betray
the very purpose for which it is made," we declared, '~unless it is
so drawn that those nations which are held back from participation in it at first shall, nevertheless, immediately become subject
to its jurisdiction and may look forward ultimately to winning a
place alongside the others." We did not specify the form of a test
by which the qualifications of candidates for membership should
be measured, but we definitely rejected the view that a state with
a bad record for past aggression would on that account alone be
permanently disqualified for admission to the Organization~s governing bodies.
H
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The Com'mission to Study the Organization of Peace has never
changed its position respecting the desirable character of the
United Nations. In our Tenth Report, .r.rStrengthening the United
Nations," published in 1957, we declared that "the Commission
adheres to the fundamental proposition that the United Nations
should be a universal organization. To this end," we added, .r'we
believe that all states able to discharge the obligations of membership should be admitted, if they apply." Willingness to apply for
membership seemed to us acceptable evidence of intent to abide
by the obligations of membership. Ability to discharge those obligations would be the qualification concerning which the Organization would have to exercise a discretionary authority at the time of
admission.
In our Eleventh Report, "Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age,"
published in 1959, we dealt with the problem of membership at
greater length. "We believe," we then wrote, "that every independent state should be a member of the United Nations and that
every government actually in power within such a state should be
permitted and encouraged to take part in the wotk of the Organization' thereby clearly acknowledging the obligation to respect the
provisions of the Charter. The Charter contains the most advanced
statement of the principles of civilized international relations to
which states have thus far bound themselve.s by agreement. Universal acceptance of the obligations incorporated in the Charter is
the necessary foundation for progress toward world order. Thus
membership in the United Nations should not be considered simply as a privilege, but as a solemn responsibility."
That the erection of a universal structure of law and order had
become a matter of practical politics was the view also of the four
founding powers of the permanent United Nations Organization.
In the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, the United States,
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of China
joined in declaring "that they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practical date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peaceloving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and
small, for the maintenance of international peace and security."
Thus the rule was adopted that membership should be restricted
to peace-loving states. By peace-loving was meant, as the event
showed, the states which fought in World War II against the Axis
Powers.
With the growth of the Organization in its early years the meaning of peace-loving expanded. States which had persisted in guarding their neutrality during the War were admitted to membership
10

without any particular inquiry into the nature of their love for
peace, and eventually former Axis Powers also were admitted,
Italy and Austria in 1955 and Japan a year later. Both of the first
two Secretaries-General, Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjold, were
earnest advocates of a broad interpretation of the provisions of the
Charter concerning the qualifications for admission. Lie, in his illstarred Twenty-Year Program for Peace, promulgated on the eve
of the fighting in Korea, dealt with the membership problem in the
fifth of his proposed Ten Points. Here he bluntly called for proceeding toward universal membership without mentioning any
need for investigating the love-life of non-member nations. Hammarskjold sponsored no similar Program, but welcomed more than
forty new members into the Organization with few questions
asked concerning either their intentions or their capabilities. International lawyers might argue about the interpretation of the
qualifications for membership, but international politicians showed
little inferest in their arguments. (S~e Quincy Wright, memorandum on Legal Obstacles to Universal Membership. Appendix A.)
The need for universality, though not clearly seen in 1945 at
San Francisco, was evident even then to many of the delegates.
(See Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Ninth Report, published by the Commission, 1955, p. 20.) As early as 1950
John Foster Dulles, who had taken an active part with the United
States delegation at San Francisco, confessed that "a growing
weakness of the United Nations is its lack of universality." He
added: "I have now come to believe that the United Nations will
best serve the cause of peace, if its Assembly is representative of
what the world actually is, and not merely representative of the
parts which we like." (See his Peace and War, N. Y. 1950, pp. 188,
190.) This belief follows logically from the four main purposes of
the United Nations, set forth in Article I of the Charter. It applies
to the newest Member States, springing from the liquidation of
colonial empires, as well as to those previously admitted to the
Org.anization.
The first of these purposes is to maintain international peace
and security. To that end the Organization was authorized to take
various collective measures involving the use of force to ensure
compliance with the obligations of membership. The Charter further provided that even non-members shall act in accordance with
its principles as far as may be necessary for the maintenance of
international peace and security. This provision, howeveJ;, is not
altogether satisfactory, because it seeks to compel independent
states to observe rules of conduct to which they are not legally
bound and the United Nations itself should always set a good
11

example of scrupulous respect for law. This difficulty can be
corrected by the admission of such states to membership in the
Organization, even weak and politically inexperienced states in
tropical Africa.
The Organization was also authorized in furtherance of the first
of its purposes to bring about by peaceful means adjustments of
international disputes or settlements of situations which might
lead to breaches of the peace. Here again the good offices of the
United Nations should be more acceptable and effective, when
the Organization is dealing with Member States, because nonmembers are under no lawful obligation to utilize its procedures
of peaceful settlement. The Organization's effectiveness should be
enhanced by admitting independent states to membership, by no
means excluding newly liberated states in tropical Africa. In fact
the experience of the first sixteen years under the Charter shows
that the mediatory powers of the United Nations are more promising of satisfactory results than the coercive. As John Foster Dulles
once wisely observed: "The possibility of peaceful change is the
fundamental pre-requisite for peace."
The second of the Organization's purposes is to develop friendly
relations among nations. Friendly relations, based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, as
the Charter requires, cannot be assured, if some nations are excluded from the opportunity to communicate their views, and to
acquire understanding of the views of others, in the general forum
of the United Nations. Nations no more than individuals can be
"civilized" by ostracism. The "practice of tolerance" and the will
to live "as good neighbors," called for by the Charter, are hardly
to be expected of states excluded from the "club" and branded as
inferior. Nor are these desirable attitudes to be expected of Member States in their relations to non-members so excluded and
branded.
The third purpose is to achieve international cooperation in
certain specified and important fields of action. Such cooperation
cannot proceed satisfactorily if some states whose collaboration
is desired are excluded from discussions proposing cooperative
action or from participation in the resulting operations. It is true
that the autonomous position of the Specialized Agencies makes
it possible for states to limit their cooperation to areas in which
they may claim an interest, but the Economic and Social Council

and the General Assembly coordinate the activities of the Specialized Agencies. Therefore, whatever their particular areas of
interdependence, all states, including the newest, weakest, and
most inexperienced, should participate in the United Nations itself.
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Moreover, the need for universal cooperation is particularly evident in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The
essence of these rights and freedoms is the recognition that all
members of the human race are entitled to enjoy them without
distinction on account of race, sex, language, or religion. The more
respect for essential rights is lacking in a state, the more important
it is that the state should be subject to the obligations of the
Charter and the scrutiny of the Organization.
The need for universal cooperation is likewise evident in the
fields of nuclear testing, arms control, and disarmament. Such
cooperation can best be promoted by membership in the United
Nations, which commits its members to discussion of the principles of disarmament in the General Assembly (Article 11), and to
the formulation of specific plans for disarmament in the Security
Council (Article 26). The newly liberated colonial dependencies
may not be the states whose excessive armaments are most in
need of limitation, but they are among the states which are most
eager for effective limitations on the armaments of others.
Furthermore, there is need for universal cooperation in the development and codification of international law. A world rule of
law implies the collaboration of all states in both the formulation
and maintenance of legal rules, principles, and standards. While
non-member states have been invited to conferences for the codification of international law, as for example the Conference on the
Regime of the Seas in 1958, the initiation of projects in this field
takes place in the International Law Commission and the General
Assembly. Active interest in this work is desirable on the part of
nations with experience under all kinds of legal systems. Acceptance of the results of international conferences is bound to
be uncertain among states which, because of non-membership in
the United Nations, have not taken an active part in the proceedings.
The fourth and last of the main purposes of the United Nations
is to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the
attainment of common ends. For obvious reasons hostile or merely
indifferent relations between members and non-members, far from
being harmonized by discussions among the former in the United
Nations, are likely to be aggravated by the exclusion of the latter.
The admission of the newly liberated states is most desirable from
this point of view. They have been so fortunate in many cases as
to obtain their freedom without serious fighting and are specially
interested in developing the opportunities for further peaceful
changes in their relationships with one another and with the outer
world. If the purposes of the United Nations are accepted as valid,
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the admission to membership of all independent states, capable
of fulfilling their responsibilities under the Charter, is logically
necessary and proper.
At the beginning of 1962 there were 104 Member States in the
United Nations-more than twice the original membership at the
beginning of 1946-and the attainment of universality was in
sight. Additional members may be expected from three sources.
The most productive source is the crop of new states to be raised
from the dependent territories of obsolete colonial empires in
process of liquidation. A second source of additional members is
the group of divided states resulting from the failure of the principal victor nations to settle by suitable treaties of peace sundry
troublesome problems growing out of the defeat of the German
and Japanese forces in the second World War. Finally, there is
one member of the former League of Nations, Switzerland, which
has refused up to now- to accept membership in the United Nations. Altogether there may be more than half a hundred additional states which will have to be brought into the United Nations
family in some manner-not necessarily in all cases as full-Hedged
Member States-if the United Nations is to become a genuinely
universal organization.
II. St(Jitzerland

The problem of Switzerland is the least urgent but most tractable. This well-governed and prosperous state was an active and
useful member of the League of Nations. It contributed competent
and dedicated personnel to the League Secretariat and administrative agencies, as well as able and forward-looking representatives
to its political leadership. But Swiss participation in the League
did not prevent the catastropbe of World War II and Swiss statesmanship preserved with great difficulty throughout the War a
precarious neutrality. The Swiss had little difficulty persuading
themselves after the War that they could continue to maintain
their precious neutrality more surely outside than within the
United Nations.
Swiss neutrality offers certain advantages to the major powers
both in war and in peace. The protection of neutral territory may
be a valuabl~ convenience for various belligerent activities in time
of war, and in time of peace the good offices of neutral diplomats
are always available at the call of more powerful nations involved
in threatening situations and embarrassed by the lack or the inadequacy of direct diplomatic contacts. But Swiss statesmen could
render even greater services as officers of the United Nations.
14

Moreover Swiss contributions to its revenues would be very helpful in this trying period of financial stringency. The admission of
Switzerland would be most welcome to the responsible members
of the United Nations, if the Swiss could be persuaded to apply
for membership.
1. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recommends that greater efforts be made to convince the Swiss that the
interests of a genuine neutrality can be better served within than
without the United Nations. Switzerland has always been a supporter of the World Court at The Hague. It has joined most of the
UN Specialized Agencies, several of which maintain their headquarters on Swiss soil. The former League of Nations headquarters in Geneva has been turned over to the United Nations for use
as its principal branch office in Europe. In ·short, Switzerland is
already so deeply involved in the activities of the United Nations
family that membership in the parent Organization itself is a
logical, and should be an early, culmination of this relationship.
III. Germany

The problem of the divided states is both more urgent and more
difficult. In the case of Germany the problem has been allowed to
drift too long. When the War ended, the victorious Powers were
laboring under the spell of the earlier German successes, and
schemes for the permanent division of the Third Reich .gained
favorable attention in various quarters. Fears of a revival of German military power outweighed hopes for a German contribution
to the maintenance of international peace and security. But now
in parts of the West hopes for a German contribution to international security outweigh fears of a revival of German military
power. Western Germany has already been reintegrated, and only
Russian opposition prevents the completion of the process.
The potent fact is that the Germans stand at the cross-roads
between the way of-the Past and the way of the Future. The way
of the Past was called Nationalism, and it once formed the broad
high road between obsolescent monarchies, which were clearly
destined to pass away, and more vigorous democratic states, which
promised to usher in what we used to call modern times. But
Nationalism has done its work in this part of the world, and in
the extreme form which it took under Hitler's misguided leadership demonstrated its unfitness for an essential task of the present
time, the building of larger political entities capable of managing
the bigger problems of this nuclear and electronic age. It is time
for the Germans to choose between renewing the dreams of the
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republicans of 1848, and the fresh visions of their modern successors, who will settle for nothing short of European, or at least West
European, Union. Would the contemporary Germans really be
content with the completion of the task, which Bismarck only
partially performed and Hitler botched, or would they prefer to
be leading members of a wider political community, based on the
further development of the European Coal and Steel, the European Atomic Energy, and the European Economic ("Common
Market") communities?
Noone can confidently predict the future of the German people.
History offers to the political prognosticator uncertain guidance
based on imperfect analogies. In the case of the Germans there is
the analogy of their close relatives and neighbors, the Netherlanders, long better known as the Dutch and the Flemish. Once
united as members of the Holy Roman Empire, they were eventually separated by the Protestant Reformation, the rise of the
Dutch Republic, and the Westphalian Treaties at the close of the
Thirty Years War, and the Flemish became associated with the
French-speaking Walloons. Reunited at the close of the Napoleonic Wars by the Congress of Vienna, they could not long endure a close association and again broke in two parts, the modern
N etherlands and another part for which a name had to be filched
from classical antiquity. Now Belgium and the Netherlands are
growing closer together again in the new Common Market and
allied communities, to which the West Germans have also adhered. They all seem to be following a natural principle of political order. Outsiders with their own special interests should interfere as little as possible. Let the peoples of modem Germany be
free to make their own decisions in matters that primarily concern
themselves.
American policy in recent years has favored the closer organization of Western Europe. The Marshall Plan produced the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, replaced in September 1961 by the new Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development. NATO produced the drive for a European Defense
Community, frustrated by French resistance. But the Coal and
Steel Community, the Atomic Energy Community, and the Economic Community (the "Common Market") are flourishing. The
West Germans, who belong to all these communities, may look
forward to a brilliant future as a leader in a gradual evolution
toward an integrated political community, which would make
Western Europe a new superpower of major importance in this
rapidly changing world.
Americans cannot afford to take an inflexible attitude toward
16

the problem of Germany. We are pledged under the United Nations Charter to seek peaceful solutions to our international problems; we cannot have recourse to war as an instrument of American policy for Germany; we cannot permit the Germans to try to
settle their problem by force. The possibility of peaceful change
is the primary prerequisite for a satisfactory solution of the German problem. The American task is to help create the conditions
under which it may be possible for the Germans to settle their
mutual political relations peacefully and primarily in their own
interest without undue concern for the fears or hopes of more
heavily armed Powers with their own security primarily in mind.
This task can best be accomplished through the United Nations.
American influence there should be thrown in favor of bringing
Germany, or the two Germanies, into the United Nations. The
Security Council should have an opportunity to recommend, and
the General Assembly to decide, its or their admission. Which it
should be, one or two Germanies, is a determination that can best
be reached through the processes of parliamentary diplomacy. The
genuine devotion of many Members of the United Nations to its
purposes and their firm belief in its principles create an atmosphere favorable to a political rather than a military solution of the
problem. All the major powers will have an equal opportunity to
get the German problem settled consistently with their interest in
the maintenance of peace and security. The sooner Germany, or
the two Germanies, are brought into the United Nations, and
become subject to the obligations of membership, the less the
danger that this highly flammable situation will burst into hot war.
The universal interest in keeping the peace must be made to prevail over the special interests of the various states concerned with
the German problem.
The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace is aware
that a. strong case can be made for either of the suggested solutions of the German problem. A unified Germany would have to
be a politically non-aligned Germany, if the consent of all the
major powers were to be secured for that solution. What this
might mean may be conje.c tured from the record of Switzerland
in the League of Nations and from that of Austria in the United
Nations. The Austrians in recent years, like the Swiss formerly,
have shown that representatives of a non-aligned Member State
can render useful service in a general international organization.
A non-aligned Germany, it might be argued, should become an
even more valuable member of the United Na,tions than Austria
or Switzerland.
Significant proposals for the reunification and non-alignment of
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Germany have generally been accompanied by proposals for the
similar treatment of other Central European States, already members of the United Nations. The plan suggested by the Polish
Foreign Minister, Rapacki, in 1957, and the similar plans put forward by the British Labour Party Leader, Hugh Gaitskell, and
the American diplomat and historian, George F. Kennan, all provided for the non-alignment of other Member States on the broad
border between the Soviet Union and Western Europe. These
plans also contemplated readjustment of the relations between the
non-aligned Member States and the military alliances to which
they respectively belonged. Such readjustments could not be made
without disturbing, or threatening to disturb, the relations between the alliances themselves. Eminent statesmen of the Major
Powers seemed unable to make up their minds whether the hopedfor strengthening of the United Nations and enhanced security of
Europe would be more or less than a fair equivalent for the expected weakening of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Alliance.
The alternative solution of the German problem would involve
less disturbance of the arrangements of Major Power statesmen,
but greater injury to the feelings of patriotic Germans. The possibly indefinite prolongation of the separation of East and West
Germany would seem to be a high price to pay for the privilege
of freely negotiating a reunion of the two parts of the country,
when the use of force would be excluded and no easily workable
process of peaceful change would be available. Moreover, eminent
Major Power statesmen have been unable to decide whether putting an end to the risk of hot war breaking out by mischance in
Berlin offered acceptable compensation for abandoning hope of
making the whole of Germany communist or non-communist, as
the case might be. Nevertheless, admission of the two Germanies
to the United Nations would facilitate the process of settlement
by parliamentary diplomacy, while securing to both parts of the
German people all the solid advantages flowing from membership
in the world organization. It would also enable harassed Major
Power statesmen to share the responsibility for finding a solution
of the German problem with the representatives of Member States
better situated for the exacting business of international mediation and conciliation.
2. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recommends that the German problem be referred to the United Nations. Our Commission recognizes that German unification is not
likely to be realized in the near future. But it is convinced that
the time has come for the United Nations to take a hand in the
search for a solution. Whether there shall be for the near future
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two Germanies or one is a question which has waited too long for
an answer. The Security Council should inquire into the advisability and possibility of admi·t ting a reunited Germany, or the two
Germanies, to membership and should recommend appropriate
action to the General Assembly.
IV. China

The problem of China also has been allowed to drift too long.
Like the German problem that of China involves the division of
a once powerful country, inhabited by a proud people, eager to
regain for themselves a suitable position in the world. But there
are important differences between the problems of the two peoples. China, unlike Germany, is already a member of the United
Nations, and possesses one of the permanent seats in the Security
Council. The question is, which of two Chinese Governments is
entitled to sit in the Security Council and in the General Assembly,
and enjoy the rights and privileges of a Major Power.
The problem of China, again unlike that of Germany, grew
out of victory, not defeat, in the second World War. The Province
of Taiwan, or Formosa, taken from China by Japan in 1895, had
been promised to China by her allies as one of the fruits of victory,
and was in fact duly yielded by the Japanese after their defeat,
although Japan retained formal title until renounced, without
specifying to whom, by the peace treaty which went into force in
1951. But which Government is entitled to recognition as the
government of China, the Nationalist Government which, losing
effective control of the mainland to the Communists in the civil
war, took refuge on the island, or the Communist Government,
which has actually ruled the mainland since 1949? After 1950
possession of Taiwan by the Nationalist Government was guaranteed by the Government of the United States, which was unwilling that the island should become a military base of the
Communist Government after the latter's intervention in the international police operation in Korea. But is Taiwan an integral
part of China, or is it an autonomous territory, pending a final
settlement of all the international disputes in the general area
of East Asia?
There is another important difference between the circumstances of the two problems. In Germany a settlement acceptable
to the United States could easily be reached by a popular plebiscite. A majority of the Germans would favor a unified republic
under a non-communist government. But in China the Nationalist
Government has clearly lost the mandate of Heaven, as the tradi19

tional Chinese expression runs. In Germany the interests of the
United States call for recognizing the right of a majority to determine the political complexion of the whole country, but in China
American interests seem to call for protecting ·t he right of the
people in Taiwan to determine the political complexion of their
particular part of the country. Under these circumstances the
Government of the United States finds itself in a real dilemma.
Consistency would require the adoption.of the same policy in the
West and in the East. Inconsistency would be more agreeable to
American interests, but would make fewer friends among the
nations and diminish American influence in world politics. The
German problem could at least be kept out of the United Nations.
The Chinese problem came up . at each session of the General
Assembly, where consideration of the Communist Government's
claim to the seat occupied by the Nationalist~ was regularly in
order, and with increasing difficulty the American Government
managed to keep it off the agenda. But this was merely an evasion,
not a settlement, of the problem.
The Kennedy Administration wisely abandoned this policy of
evasion. Consideration of proposed solutions of the problem of
China on their merits showed that there were more than two
sides of the problem. First, the Communist Government in power
on the mainland might be recognized as the legitimate representative of China in the United Nations. Secondly, the Nationalist Government in exile on Taiwan might continue to be regarded as the de jure, if not the de facto, government of the
country, entitled to retain its place in the Security Council and
General Assembly. Thirdly, the Taiwan regime might be accepted as an autonomous region within the Chinese Republic,
or an independent state, with a vote in the G; neral Assembly in
addition to that of Mainland China.
The case for the first solution was presented . by the British
Government when in 1949 it recognized the Communist Government at Peking as the lawful government of the country. It was
excessively unrealistic, the British contended, to continue to recognize the Nationalist regime as the Government of China, when it
no longer possessed any authority on the mainland. Moreover,
ignoring the legal existence of the Peking Government was too
inconvenient, when for instance negotiations were necessary in
order to secure the release of missionaries and others detained in
Chinese Communist prisons. It became dangerous, the British
argument continued, and might easily have led to- war, when the
United States intervened with its fleet for the purpose of protecting Taiwan against forcible subjection to the authority of Peking.
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Finally, it was a formidable obstacle in the way of general agreement upon the limitation and reduction of armaments and other
enlightened measures which were demanded by the true interests
of the West.
The people living under the rule of the Peking Government,
constituting between a quarter and a fifth of all mankind, are an
indispensable part of the world community, for which the United
Nations with its forward-looking Charter is at least a living symbol.
The General Assembly cannot reflect the various wants of the
world community or voice its aspirations without authentic spokesmen fQr a~l the Chinese people. Parliamentary diplomacy cannot
be practiced there with the best prospects of full effectiveness
without the presence of their representatives. Moreover such an
entity as the Peoples Republic of China should be clearly subjected to the. obligations stat~d in the Charter. This requires its
representation in the United Nations.
The case for the second solution has been forcefully stated by
a private propagandist association, styled the American Security
Council, in ·a special issue of its "Washington Report," June 1961.
This organization was strongly of the opinion that the record of
the Peking Government in its relations with its neighbors as well
as with the United Nations did not support the claim that it was
the government of a "peace-loving" state. The objections to the
admission of Communist China's representatives into the United
Nations were summarized in the following four theses: (1) c'The
U nited States's strategic position in the Far East ... would be irreparably damaged." (2) ccThe United States's moral position as
leader of essential Free-World alliances would be destroyed."
(3) The United States should not support the two-China concept. (4) The United Nations would be rendered c'completely
ineffective."
The case against the seating of representatives of Communist
China in the United Nations was widely accepted in the United
States, where the participation of Communist forces in the military
operations in Korea had made an unpopular war much more difficult for the American people. Though fifteen other Member States
furnished contingents wp.ich fought alongside the American forces,
the main burden of the fighting in Korea fell upon South Korea
and the United States. The idea of Communist Chinese participation in a general international organization, whose authority they
had been resisting on the Korean battle-fields, was highly repugnant. There was even talk of American withdrawal from the United
Nations, if representatives of the Peking Government were admitted to its deliberations. Such talk gave the case against the Peking
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Government greater influence in the United Nations than it might
otherwise have had.
The case for an autonomous Taiwan, which should have separate representation in the United Nations in addition to the representatives of the Peking Government, has received less consideration than the others. Though sometimes called the C'two-Chinas"
plan, this is an obvious misnomer. Both the Peking and the Taiwan
Government regard Taiwan as a Chinese province and reject all
suggestions that it become an independent state. The Government
of the United States declared its intention to return the island to
China in the Cairo Declaration of 1943, but the peace treaty with
Japan did not explicitly accomplish this result. In recent years the
American government has steadily insisted that the Government
·on Taiwan is in law, if not in fact, the Government of China.
But conditions on the island are very different from those on the
mainland. Japanese capital and enterprise during the Japanese
occupation caused more rapid development of island industry
than that in mainland China. American capital and enterprise in
recent years have continued the development of the island until '
Taiwan has reached a more advanced stage of economic development than any country in Asia except Japan. The people of Taiwan,
though of Chinese extraction, may not want a close connection
with those on the mainland. The relationship between the two, if
both were members of the United Nations, would have a better
chance of being determined, not by force, but by pacific settlement.
In the Sixteenth General Assembly the problem of China was
discussed at length for the first time. On Dec. 15, 1961, the discussion ended in a vote on a resolution introduced by the Soviet Union,
calling for the seating of representatives of the Peking Government
in place of those from Taiwan. This resolution naturally caused
the advocates of all other solutions of the Chinese problem to combine against the advocates of the first solution. It is not surprising
that the Soviet U nion~s resolution was defeated. The actual vote
was 37 in favor, 48 against, and 19 abstaininng.
This result was not much more encouraging for the supporters
of the second solution under American leadership than for the
supporters of the first under Russian leadership. Neither side polled
a majority of the total membership of the United Nations. Sixteen
of the non-aligned and uncommitted Member States and three of
the United States~ military allies, obviously preferring some other
solution, held the balance of power between the Russian and
American groups. Four of the United States' military allies, signincantly headed by the United Kingdom, supported the Russian
resolution. The Soviet bloc of course voted solidly for its own reso22

lution. Of the other votes for the resolution twenty came from
members of the Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned States and
three from the other uncommitted Member States. It was evident
that some acceptable form of the so-called "two Chinas" solution
would have to be found.

3. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recommends the recognition of an autonomous Taiwan, entitled to its
own representatives in the General Assembly, in addition to the
representatives of the Peking Government regarded as·the effective
government of China. There is an excellent opportunity here for
an imaginative act of creative statesmanship. The two parts of the
Chinese people, protesting that they are all one people, should be
more capable of settling their differences by peaceful negotiation
within the frame-work of the United Nations. Before the employment of more drastic measures that opportunity should be provided for them.

v.

K.o rea and Vietnam

The other 'd ivided states, Korea and Vietnam, present two
problems, resembling in some ways but not in all the problems of
Germany and China. Each of these states possesses an ancient history and venerable cultural traditions. Both have been tributaries
of the Chinese Empire. Confucian Temples in die capitals and
monuments in the villages to the success of local scholars at the
triennial civil service examinations attest the long domination of
classical Chinese,political ideas and the wide diffusion of classical
Chinese political institutions. Korea was wrenched loose from the
Chinese political system by the Japanese near the end of the nineteenth century; Vietnam, by the French only a few years earlier.
Both Korea and Vietnam mixed their classical Chinese politics
with the Buddhist religion originally derived from India, forming
a solid base for resistance to the dogmatic Marxism-Leninism derived from the Soviet Union. Yet in recent years conditions in both
made for a hospitable reception to new ideas of political and economic freedom streaming in from the West. Modern nationalism
and anti-colonialism combined to make two proud peoples intensely desirous of possessing the advantages of both Western
scientific and technical progress and a government of their own
conducted by their own leaders and primarily for their own benefit. Each country boasted a population of twice the size of most
United Nations Member States. In each intelligent young men with
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modern educations looked forward to a respectable position for
their state and people in the contemporary family of nations.
Both countries were divided by accident rather than design. In
Korea the Soviet Union accepted the surrender of the Japanese
forces in the northern region and the United States accepted it in
the south. Each of these two Powers naturally wished to guide the
further development of the country, thus casually falling under
their control, according to its own sense of what was necessary and
proper. The Russians wished to establish a Communist regime; the
Americans, an example of the free-enterprise system. The Americans urged that the Koreans, of whom the South Koreans under
United States influence formed a large majority, should be permitted to determine their own national character by a United Nations
plebiscite. Thus the problem of Korea resembled that of Germany.
The Russians stubbornly resisted the incorporation of their part
into the whole; the Americans stoutly contended for the integrity
of Korea.
In Vietnam conditions led to the contrary result. The Japanese
had ousted the French from the country during the war, and
modem-minded Vietnamese resisted their return. The regime
which the French sought to establish was least acceptable to
Vietnamese with political and economic ideas made in Moscow
and leadership of the nationalist and anti-colonialist cause fell into
their hands. Their greatest strength lay in the northern part of the
country, where support from bey'ond the border was most readily
available. When the French decided to abandon their claim to the
country, possession of the North was surrendered to the resistance
forces under Ho Chi Minh, and a regime more agreeable to French
influence was installed in the south.
The settlement reached at Geneva in 1954 provided for the
division of French Indo-China into three parts. Two of the parts,
Cambodia and Laos, were declared independent states and admitted to the United Nations the following year. Vietnam, however,
was divided between two separate governments, one operating in
the north and the other in the south, and could not be admitted
immediately. The state was to be unified later after a plebiscite to
ascertain the choice of the people between the two regimes. But
the population of the North exceeded that of the South, and the
government of the Southern regime opposed such a solution.
The United States also, though inconsistent with its position on
Korea and Germany, opposed reunification by plebiscite. Thus the
problem of Vietnam resembled that of China. Should there not
be, therefore, since the conditions are similar, some kind of "two
Vietnams" solution?
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4. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recommends that the Korean and Vietnamese problems be referred to
the United Nations. Every effort should be made to arrange at the
earliest practicable time a general settlement of the problems of
Korea and Vietnam. Our Commission recognizes that Korean and
Vietnamese unification is not likely to be realized in the near
future, but it is convinced that the time has come for the United
Nations to take a more active part in the search for a solution.
The services of the Secretary-General and his principal aides, who
constitute the world's most valuable agency for promoting peaceful
change in international relationships, would be more available for
encouraging and assisting negotiations to that end. If successful,
such negotiations would be an important step toward universal
membership. This would make a substantial contribution toward
achieving the purposes of the Organization.

VI. Liberated Colonies
The problem of the new states to be created from the dependent
territories of obsolete colonial empires in process of liquidation is
an extension of the problem already presented ·b y the recent admission to the United Nations of numerous former colonial dependencies with little or no previous experience of self-government as
practiced either in the modern West or in the classical Far East.
In some of these new states periods of tutelage under the mandates
system of the League of Nations or the trusteeship system of the
United Nations, or both, have supplied limited training in modem
processes of government. In others, notably in the former British
and French colonies, fruitful opportunities for political education
abroad were extended to the more promising aspirants for leadership among the indigenous peoples. In still others, notably in the
Belgian Congo, educational opportunities had been restricted to
persons in clerical or industrial occupations with little regard for
the needs of future political development. In the colonies of countries ruled by military dictatorships, notably Portugal and Spain,
there was even less concern for the political education of the indigenous populations than for that of the subject peoples at home.
From such sources, beginning in 1945 with the Philippines and
pausing at the end of 1961 with Tanganyika, more than forty
newly independent states have been admitted to the United Nations. A majority of th~se new Member States have been carved
out of former colonial areas in tropical Africa. Indeed nearly all
the new Member States admitted to the United Nations in recent
years are of tropical African origin. With the addition of these
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former colonial dependencies the Member States in Africa and
Asia compose a majority of the total membership of the United
Nations. The political complexion of the United Nations has been
radically changed.
The original leaders of the movement to establish a general
international organization for the purpose of keeping the peace,
and helping to create conditions around the world under which
peace-keeping might be most likely to succeed, were states in the
West where modern industry was highly developed and capital
available for export was abundant. In the nature of things the most
influential members of the League of Nations were highly industrialized. The leadership of the United Nations in its early years
was similar. The experience of the period between the two 'w orld
wars was needed to cause the United States to take its proper part
in the establishment of the latter organization. But the responsible
leadership of both organizations was vested in nations with advanced technology and highly developed productive capa~ity.
Now the underdeveloped nations possess a majority of the votes
in the UN General Assembly. Leadership in that body must be
responsive to the needs of emergent nations whose wants exceed
their productive capacity to satisfy. The difficult task of creating
conditions around the world under which peace-keeping may be
most likely to succeed cannot be managed by the well-developed
nations alone. They must take account of the wishes of peoples
who could be ignored in the "good old days" before the liquidation
of the West European empires had begun. This new nuclear and
electronic age is indeed an age that is radically different from what
we used to call modern times.
It is not surprising that some Americans, including even a few
who cherished hign hopes for the United Nations in its early years,
should have become distrustful of the Organization in its present
form. They question the qualifications of newly independent states
with so little modem education and industrial capacity for an equal
position in the management of a general international organization
with an important role in world politics. May not these new
Member States act irresponsibly in the exercise of their unfamiliar
powers? Will they not fall under the influence of the Soviet Union
and turn the United Nations against its original leaders? Has not
the United States already lost control of the Organization and does
it not jeopardize its own security by relying overmuch on this unproven international machinery for producing a rule of law under
the Charter?
Such fears are magnified by the prospect of the further growth
of the Organization through the admission to membership of
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additional new states from the continued liquidation of obsolete
colonial empires. The expected additional states will on the whole
compare unfavorably with those already admitted. The inhabitants of the Portuguese and Spanish possessions in tropical Africa
are even less prepared for independence than those of the Belgian
Congo. The remaining British, Dutch, and French dependencies
are mostly smaller than those already liberated; they are more
widely scattered; many of them are insular possessions with inadequate resources for maintaining the character of a sovereign
state in the modern world. Are they all presently to have an
equal voice in the UN General Assembly?
Uncertainty concerning the lengths to which anti-colonialism
will be carried by the African and Asian Member States in the
United Nations increases the existing reluctance to make membership in the Organization universal. A delegate to the General
Assembly from Sierra Leone may concede that one from St. Helena,
if and when that isolated island is admitted to membership, should
not have an equal voice with himself, but will the delegate from
St. Helena prove equally reasonable? The percentage of the world's
population still living in colonial dependencies is small-apparently less than two per cent of the total-but its destiny is obscure.
It is difficult even to estimate the number of additional Member
States that would be brought into the United Nations family by
the complete triumph of modem anti-colonialism. It is clear, however, that in the remaining colonial empires there are many potential candidates for admission.
It is easy to exaggerate the difficulties for the United Nations
that may arise from the complete liquidation of the obsolete colonial empires. The case of Western Samoa may have unexpected
significance. This former German possession, which had been
under the tutelage of New Zealand first through a League of
Nations mandate and then as a United Nations trusteed territory,
gained its independence at the beginning of 1962. Instead of applying for immediate admission to the United Nations, however, it
announced that it would be content for the near future with selfgovernment without active participation in world politics. What
this may mean as a precedent does not yet appear, but it is clear
that there is wide room for experimentation in the development
of new relatioI).ships between the United Nations and the liberated
colonial dependencies.
It must be admitted that the liquidation of the colonial empires
has created new problems for the United Nations. Many of the
newly liberated states are comparatively small, as well as underdeveloped and lacking in political experience. Their boundaries
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problems. There is much to be done, as the Commission to Study
the Organization of Peace has shown in previous reports, to
strengthen the United Nations and develop its capacity to achieve
its objectives. One of these necessary tasks, we believe, is to bring
into the Organization all independent states capable of fulfilling
the obligations of membership. The purposes of the United Nations, we are convinced, cannot be fully accomplished until it
becomes a universal organization.
5. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recommends, therefore, that new independent states, resulting from the
continued liquidation of colonial empires, be promptly admitted
to the United Nations, if capable of fulfilling their responsibilities
under the Charter. The Commission sees no need for further tests
of such capacity beyond what have been applied in connection
with recent admissions. States whose governments doubt their
readiness to meet the expenses of membership in the United
Nations and of maintaining permanent delegations at the headquarters in New York may, like Western Samoa, prefer a less
formal relationship to the Organization. In some cases an answer
to this problem may be found in the formation of federations, as
the British colonies in the West Indies have been trying to do.
There is wide room for imaginative experimentation in this field
of political engineering.
What is most urgently needed is a suitable successor to the
Trusteeship Council and the Committee on Information from
Non-Self-Governing Territories. It should command the services
of technical experts able to assist small states in the development
of federations, where conditions are favorable, and in the maintenance of a viable independent existence, where federalization
is impracticable. It is difficult to define the minimum size of a state
to be admitted to the United Nations, but the line should be drawn
to exclude very small states. Lichtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino
show how even the smallest independent states can find for themselves a satisfactory place in the United Nations family through
membership in Specialized Agencies without formally joining the
Organization or sitting in the General Assembly. Newly liberated
and politically inexperienced states, though more populous and
productive than any of these three, may well need further assistance before assuming all the obligations of a regular member state.
The Organization should be in a position to supply such assistance,
particularly if the new small state falls also in the category of
underdeveloped. The new council or committee would not only
protect and assist these smaller states but also represent their
interests before agencies of the United Nations.
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6. The Commission recommends further, therefore, ' that the
United Nations encourage the formation of federations under the
appropriate circumstances by newly liberated peoples desiring
admission to membership. The Organization has already shown
itself hospitable to the formation of federations by Member States
in the case of the United Arab Republic. This attitude should be
maintained. and· technical aid and other assistance might well be
extended to states bent on experimenting with projects of federalization. The formation of larger political units is a natural phenomenon in this nuclear and electronic age. There is abundant
opportunity in the United Nations, as presently organized, for the
further appplication of the principle of federalism.
7. The Commission also recommends the development of more.
informal relationships between the Organization and autonomous
areas or independent states of limited resources springing· from the
continued liquidation of colonial empires. For many of the small
dependencies the important end result should be self-government,
and not necessarily active participation in world politics. The possibility of peaceful changes in international relationships is a greater attraction to these states than that of participation in organized
arrangements for collective coercion of states contemptuous of
their obligations under the Charter. The impressive achievements
of the United Nations in recent years in promoting peaceful settlements in various threatening situations suggest the desirability of
devising suitable relationships with independent states primarily
interested in the development of this most promising function of
parliamentary diplomacy and of the Secretary-General. The failure
in the case of the Portuguese colonies in India, where international
law seemed to favor one side and natural equity the other, emphasizes the importance of pushing this development as rapidly as
possible. There is much that should and c~n be done to make the
dissolution of the obsolete colonial empires a source of additional
strength and not merely of additional problems for the United
Nations.
VII. UlJited States Policy
Despite the great strength of the general case for universal
membership in the United Nations there is opposition to the admission of certain types of states. In recent years the critics of
universality have directed their objections particularly against the
admissibility of increasing numbers of small, weak, and politically
inexperienced states springing from the liquidation of the colonial
empires. They complain of the unwillingness of many of these
states to share equitably the expenses and other obligations of the
United Nations, while insisting on a full and equal voice in the
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making of decisions, the burdens of which must be assumed by
others. They think they see a growing ~~double standard" of international morality, reflected in a disposition to condone resort to
military force in violation of the Charter by Member States with
whose objectives they sympathize, while applying stricter tests to
other Member States. They deplore an allegedly growing tendency
to bloc voting which puts the interests of special groups of states
ahead of the general interests of the world community. They denounce an allegedly expanding tendency to interfere in the internal
affairs of other Member States. They conclude that the admission
of these states tends to throw the balance of power in the United
Nations too much in favor of the Soviet Union.
.
American critics stress particularly the effect of these new admissions on the leadership of the United States in world politics.
They assert that the American Government has lost control of the
world organization. They predict that control cannot be regained,
if these politically inexperienced Member States continue to increase in number. They conclude that the United States should put
its faith more largely in its military alliances. They urge the development of NATO or some better agent of the Western Powers
into a more effective instrument of the "free world."
A partial answer to this point of view is to raise the question:
What are the national interests of the United States in regard to
the United Nations? Is it in the national interest to consider the
United Nations (1) an instrument of United States policy, (2) an
instrument for promoting the diffusion of free democratic institutions throughout the world, (3) a reflection of world opinion as
it really is, or ( 4) an instrument for the realization of the purposes
and principles expressed in the Charter?
To the first question the answer is unmistakable. In the early
years of the Organization it was natural that the United States,
with the prestige of victory in World War II and overwhelming
power by reason of its monopoly of the atomic bomb, should have
treated the United Nations as an instrument of its own national
policies. It is clear, however, that under the changed conditions in
this rapidly changing world, if this attitude continues, the United
States cannot hold the leadership in the United Nations.
Secondly, it is equally clear that the ideal of free democracy, as
understood in the United States, will not dominate among the
membership of the United Nations in the presently foreseeable
future. This ideal is very imperfectly manifested even among the
present military allies of the United States, which include several
non-democratic and some actively anti-democratic states. Among
the non-aligned and uncommitted states only a few are in any
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proper sense of the term free democracies. The Communist states
look toward a "democratization" of their institutions along the lines
indicated in the party program, adopted at the Twenty-Second
Party Congress in October, 1961, but they believe that "the dictatorship of the proletariat" must continue, until the people are sufficiently educated in Marxism-Leninism to support voluntarily the
Communist system. Under these circumstances the United States
cannot maintain leadership in the United Nations merely bypropagandist slogans or preachments of free democracy and the virtue
of free elections.
There has been influential support for an affirmative answer to
the third question. John Foster Dulles wrote, before he became
Secretary of State, that he had "come to believe that the United
Nations will best serve the cause of peace, if its Assembly is representative of what the world actually is, and not merely representative of the parts that we like. Therefore, we ought to be willing
that all the nations should be members without attempting to
appraise closely those which are 'good' and those which are 'bad.'
Already that distinction is obliterated by the present membership
of the United Nations. Some of the present member nations, and
others that might become members, have governments that are not
representative of the people. But if in fact they are 'governments,'
-that is, if they 'govern,'-then they have a power which should
"be represented in any organization that purports to m,i rror world
reality." (See Commission to Study the Organization of Peace,
Ninth Report, p. 23.)
At that time Mr. Dulles thought that Mainland China should be
represented and, though he modified this opinion after he became
Secretary of State, he continued to favor "approximate universality" of the United Nations. His conception, however, seemed to
consider the United Nations as a passive index of opinion rather
than an active force in the world. The United States undoubtedly
has a national interest in knowing what world opinion really is
and in supporting institutions which will contribute to this knowledge. The dangers which arise from a lack of such knowledge were
indicated by recent mistakes of policy in the Cuban and Laotian
situations. These situations also indicate, however, that United Nations debate may not be adequate to reHect opinion even among
the members, though doubtless it helps. In any case the United
States has a broader interest in the United Nations than that it
shall serve merely as a mirror of world opinion.
"
The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace believes
that the United States has a major national interest in developing
the United Nations as an active force to establish conditions in the
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world under which peace, justice and respect for international
obligations can be maintained. The experience of the last seventeen
years, as well as earlier history, indicates that a free constitutional
democracy, like the United States, is at a disadvantage in an
anarchic world of states vulnerable to immediate attack and engaged in an arms race. Under such conditions democracies feel
impelled to militarize and to some extent abandon free democracy
in order to keep up in the competition, or fall behind and succumb
either to superior force or to gradual attrition. The Commission
believes that the conditions under which democracy can in the
long run survive can be maintained only by realizing the purposes
and principles set forth in the United Nations Charter.
A major national interest of the United States, therefore, is that
the United Nations achieve its purposes and maintain its principles.
This is also a major interest of a large majority of the members of
the United Nations. The non-aligned and uncommitted states are
not primarily interested in the rivalry between Communism and
Western Democracy. They see merits and defects in each system.
They are interested in the elimination of war and threats of war,
in respect for their territorial integrity and national independence, in the self-determination of peoples seeking independence,
in respect for human rights irrespective of race, color, language, or
religion, and especially in economic and social progress for underdeveloped peoples.
Policies clearly and sincerely forwarding these purposes and
principles will command a majority in the United Nations. By
taking care that its policies are of that character the United States
can maintain leadership in the United Nations now and even more
when the United Nations becomes universal and more capable of
maintaining its principles. Furthermore, leadership of this kind,
supported by the uncommitted states, would not only strengthen
the United Nations in world opinion, but would establish its impartiality in cold-war controversies and give it greater competence
than it now possesses to mediate or conciliate major controversies.
It is clearly in the national interest of the United States under
present conditions that the United Nations should occupy the position of an impartial mediator. With a universal membership and
an a ppropria te American policy this seems possible of achievement.
A further answer to the opponents of a universal United Nations
is afforded by a look at the record of actual voting in the General
Assembly. In the Sixteenth General Assembly, during which the
number of Member States rose from 99 to 104, there were three
outstanding roll calls, on which the attitudes of the United States
and the Soviet Union were in direct conBict and the division
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of opinion among the newer and less experienced members was
clearly reveared. The first of these, which took place on December
15, 1961, recorded the votes cast on a Russian resolution to solve
the China problem by seating representatives of the Peking Government in place of those from Taiwan. The second too~ place on
December 20 on a resolution, urgently supported by the United
States, proposing to meet the rapidly accumulating fiscal deficit
caused by the operations in the Congo by a bond issue of $200,000,000. The third, recorded on January 30, 1962, was occasioned
by another resolution strongly supported by the Soviet Union,
dealing in drastic fashion with the problem of Angola.
Since it is the record of the newly admitted, weak, and politically
inexperienced Member States that is of primary interest in an
analysis of the voting in the Sixteenth General Assembly, the analysis begins by putting these states in their proper places among the
other members. For this purpose the whole group of underdeveloped states requires investigation. In the light of the latest
statistics collected by the United Nations, especially those published by the Managing Director of the United Nations Special
Fund, Paul G. Hoffman, the underdeveloped states may be conveniently described as those with a gross national product below
three hundred dollars a year per capita. There were altogether
seventy-one of these Member States at the beginning of 1962. Despite important practical differences between conditions in states
with less than one hundred dollars gross national product per
capita and in others with a per capita production three times as
high, there can be no doubt that all are underdeveloped by comparison with the Member States in which modern industrial technology and capital a,?cumulation are most advanced.
The more advanced states, technologically speaking, differ
greatly among themselves. There are only sixteen Member States
which, on account of the high development of their vital industries,
especially the armaments industry, or the advanced state of development of their productive capacity generally, can be put in
the highest class. Among them the United States and the Soviet
Union are outstanding, though for different reasons. There are
seventeen Member States in various intermediate stages of development between the most advanced and those definitely classed
as underdeveloped. They range from Japan, with its advanced industry and its traditional agriculture, at one end to states like Cuba
and Venezuela, where large outside capitalistic investments have
stimulated a more rapid development of the national productive
capacity than could be effectively controlled by the traditional
economic and political institutions. (See Appendix B.)
34

In the Sixteenth General Assembly, for the first time, the ,
underdeveloped nations, many of which had been admitted to
membership in the last five years, possessed two-thirds of the total
number of votes. They were in a position to control the action of
the General Assembly, if disposed to act together. Neither the
Communist bloc, nor the military alliances organized by the United
States, could control the Assembly without the support of at least
a majority of these underdeveloped and in many cases politically
inexperienced Member States. Most of these states professed to
be uncommitted in the struggle between the two super-powers or
at least not to be formally aligned with either of them. It was
evident that their voting behavior would not only be important for
the present effectiveness of the United Nations but also significant
for its future success with the further addition of small, weak, and
politically inexperienced states growing out of the continued liquidation of obsolete colonial empires.
The pattern of voting behavior in the most advanced group of
states is impressively irregular. In the first test roll-call, the United
Kingdom and the Scandinavian states rejected the leadership of
the United States and voted with the Soviet Union for seating the
Peking representatives in place of the Taiwan representatives of
China. In the second test roll-call France and Belgium joined with
the Soviet Union in resisting the two hu'ndred million dollar bond
issue. In the third test roll-call alone did all the non-communist
states in advanced stages of industrial development vote in the
same way as the United States. It is evident that those industrially
advanced states, which hold privileged positions of potential
leadership by virtue of their permanent seats in the Security Council, are disinclined to respect any leadership but their own.
In the intermediate class of states the pattern becomes less
confused. The leadership of the Soviet Union was followed without deviation by all the Communist states. The leadership of the
United States was followed by the non-Communist states with
considerably more regularity than in the first class. Half of all the
states in this class supported the position of the United States on
the first test vote, two-thirds supported it on the second, and a
majority on the third. The general picture was clearly more favorable to American than to Russian leadership.
In the third class of underdeveloped states a different pattern

of voting emerges. The solidarity of the Communist bloc is fully
maintained, affording an example of rigid political discipline illdesigned to attract newly liberated colonial dependencies jealous
of their new found freedom and reluctant to risk it by too close
association with any leading power. There is no similar solidarity
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in any of the groups of underdeveloped states more or less closely
associated with one or another of the Western leaders. The outstanding feature of the pattern is the strong tendency of the newer
underdeveloped Member States to keep out of the conflicts between the nuclear giants. The tropical African states are the most
prone to avoid involvement in these conflicts by recording themselves on the roll-calls as present, but not voting, or by staying
away from a roll-call altogether.
These voting patterns confirm the results of a similar analysis of
leading roll-calls in the Fifteenth General Assembly. (See Commission to Study the Organization of P~ace, Fourteenth Report, published by the Commission, 1962, pp. _. 9-12.) The Commission to
Study the Organization of Peace found at that time that the record
"should -be encouraging to perceptive Americans." "The position
of the Soviet bloc," it reported, "was considerably weaker than that
of the American-formed group of states." Moreover, "the so-called
Neutralists and other non-aligned and uncommitted nations were
conspicuous for their lack of solidarity...." The Commission concluded that "the fears of those who question the qualifications of
newly liberated and politically inexperienced peoples for active
participation in United Nations politics do not seem warranted by
the recent experience of the Organization."
These conclusions are strengthened by the voting on the test
roll-calls in the Sixteenth General Assembly. The delegations from
south of the Sahara continue to support the authority of the
Secretary-General, when challenged by a major power with special
interests in view, and to avoid embroilment in the conflicts between the super-powers growing out of the manoeuvres of rival
aspirants for leadership. The unanimous election of U Thant to
fill the remainder of Dag Hammarskjold's term of office was an
impressive triumph for the forces within the United Nations which
are striving to build the kind of world order described in Articles
1 and 2 of the Charter. The unanimous choice of this firm and
politic diplomat from southeast Asia for this major world office
should greatly encourage all peace-loving peoples who believe in
the kind of peace-keeping represented by the developing operations of the UN Organization. The restrained reliance on military
force and growing emphasis on the pacific settlement of international disputes through the mediatory and conciliatory offices of
the Organization describe the most probable course of its further
development under the impact of the changing conditions iIi world
politics.
The final answer to the opponents of a universal United Nations
will be a well-planned program for the further development of the
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underdeveloped nations in all parts of the world. The great success
of the Marshall Plan naturally promoted interest in other plans for
improving economic conditions in depressed areas in other parts
of the world, by financing projects for increasing national productivity. As Western Europe returned to normality after World War
II leaders of the "free world" began to explore the possibilities of
strengthening the resistance to Soviet Communism by economic
aid to the underdeveloped countries. Under the Truman Administration the point-four program of technical assistance made a
promising beginning witl~ the cooperation of the UN Specialized
Agencies. Under the Eisenhower Administration the new policy
was carried further with the establishment of the UN Special Fund.
But both the superpowers, sustained by great expectations of favorable effects on the national fortunes in the Cold War, preferred to
put their trust chiefly in unilateral arrangements for economic aid.
Participation in operations under the United Nations received
secondary support from the Government of the United States and
less than that from the Government of the Soviet Union.
There were, of course, important differences between the
conditions with which the Marshall Plan was designed to deal and
those in the Asian and African countries for which the unilateral
American and Russian programs of economic aid and technical
assistance were designed. The basic problem was not that of restoring a shattered economy in a nation temporarily exhausted by
ruinous war; but one of developing fresh productive capability in
nations with governments lacking experience, and in many cases
also interest, in the marvels of modern science and technology.
It was a problem involving not only the supply of indispensable
technical aid and economic assistance but also the design of safeguards to prevent dependence on foreign aid from turning into a
new form of colonialism incompatible with a genuine independence. These differences were most significant in the case of the
newly liberated colonial dependencies, especially those in tropical
Mrica. Would it be possible for both the super-powers and the
new states to get what they wanted under these conditions?
The problem of rapid development in the underdeveloped states
was more complex in other ways than in the more advanced .
states for which the Marshall Plan was devised. It was not simply
a matter _of extending credit on an unprecedented scale to governments capaole of executing their own plans for relief, recovery,
and rehabilitation, if supplied with the necessary means. Fresh
capital on credit alone would not be enough. Satisfactory economic
development would require also measures for the stabilization of
prices in the world market for nations engaged mainly in the pro-
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duction of foodstuffs and raw materials. It would require technical
assistance not only in mastering the new techniques of modern
industry but also in improving ancient forms of agriculture. There
would be great need of progressive developments in the general
field of public education. There would be even the stubborn question of balancing the expected reduction in death-rates with new
forms of control over traditionally high birth-rates.
Moreover, experience soon showed that economic aid and
technical assistance, even when most effective in attaining immediate objectives, may not guarantee satisfactory relations between
the sponsors of aid programs and their beneficiaries. For instance,
the stabilization of sugar prices and the guarantee of a rich foreign
market by the Government of the United States brought Cuba to
a more advanced stage of economic development than most of the
tropical Latin American states enjoyed, but it did not produce a
Cuban Government capable of managing the economy satisfactorily. Some new political invention is required, which will enable
the United Nations to furnish acceptable guidance to newly independent nations whose economic development threatens to
outrun the development of their political capacity. This is a problem for solution by the United Nations, not by superpowers with
unilateral projects prompted by a primary concern for their own
special interests.
The experience of the United Nations Operation in the Congo
is an impressive harbinger of a new era in the development of the
United Nations. The Organization has again demonstrated its
ability to recruit an efficient peace force at short notice. Together with the Specialized Agencies, it has demonstrated also
the ability to command diversified and extensive human resources
for technical assistance. Though the coordination of these resources
has left something to be desired, the performance is apparently
proving equal to the most urgent need. The struggle to meet the
challenge of the emergency has strengthened more than it has
strained the Organization.
The greatest difficulty has been presented by the problem of
financing this abnormally expensive operation. The total cost of
the Congo activities is but a minute fraction of the direct cost of
the arms race during the same period, yet ordinary revenues of
the Organization have been permitted to fall far short of covering
the charges. There has been a strange reluctance to employ deficit
financing for this operation. American experience in the early
years of the Federal Union showed that the bold creation of public
debts for important public purposes could bring powerful support
to a struggling new organization. There should be a ready market
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among the more advanced industrialized Member States for necessary loans for expensive peace-keeping activities in an emergency.
There is also need for expanded use of the public credit in the
further economic development of underdeveloped Member States.
The experienced management of the Special Fund under the
leadership of its Managing Director, Paul G. HoHman, has already
made good use of sound techniques for preparing such programs.
What is most needed at this stage in the evolution of the United
Nations is to put greater eHorts into the development of this part
of the Organization's work. The colonial system should be supplanted by something better than the Trusteeship System, which
seems to be fulfilling its mission more rapidly than could have
been anticipated seventeen years ago. Settled arrangements
should be made for planning and financing extensive improvements in the underdeveloped Member States which will make
membership in the United Nations a manifest advance over the
status of dependencies under the old colonial system.
8. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recommends, therefore, that the public credit be employed on a large
scale to enable the United Nations Organization and Specialized
Agencies to execute carefully prepared programs of internal improvements in underdeveloped Member States.
There should be a fairer balance between the highly industrialized Member States and the underdeveloped Member States than
now exists in the raising and appropriation of money by the General Assembly under the Charter. (See discussion in our Thirteenth
Report, pp. 41 and 42). But satisfactory fiscal practices are already
established for such agencies as the International Bank and the
International Development Association. The capital funds at the
disposal of these Agencies, especially the latter, should be greatly
enlarged and their operations rapidly expanded in states which
indicate willingness to cooperate and provide an appropriate
fiscal, governmental and social climate.
9. The Commission recommends also that improved arrangements be designed for coordinating the programs of technical
assistance administered by the United Nations Secretariat and the
Specialized Agencies. The wide latitude allowed to the Specialized Agencies in the management of their activities was useful
during the experimental stage of their operations. Imaginative

thinking needed encouragement, while these Agencies were
demonstrating their practical usefulness. Now the need is for the
greatest possible operating efficiency, while their potential services
are seriously limited by insufficient financial resources. Admission
of numerous newly liberated colonial dependencies into the
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United Nations involves the Organization in new responsibilities
and requires that it must be better organized in order to meet
them effectively.
10. Finally, the Commission recommends that United States
policy in the United Nations be based on the support of the Member States most strongly committed to the Purposes and Principles
of the United Nations, set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter.
The Government of the United States, as a leading aspirant to
United Nations leadership, should rely more than heretofore on
the spontaneous collaboration of the Member States which believe
most strongly in the Organization>s capacity to achieve its objectives. There is little likelihood that either military allies, or Member States which are democracies in the Western sense of the term
and hence more likely than others to be sympathetic political
associates, will form a majority of the membership of the United
Nations in the foreseeable future. A large majority of the Member
States, however, including most of the Western-type democracies
and many others, are strongly committed to United Nations purposes and principles. They form a group, leadership of which by
the United States should be a point of departure for the further
development of American policy in world politics.

VUI. A New View

0/ an Old American Goal

Despite the great strength of the general case for a universal
United Nations there is continued opposition in various quarters
to the further strengthening and development of the Organization.
The clue to this opposition was clearly exposed by President
Kennedy in his Address to the Congress on the State of the Union,
January 11, 1962. "But arms alone are not enough to keep the
peace,n he declared; "it must be kept by men. n Then he stated his
main point with impressive clarity and force. "Our instrurrnent and
our hope is the United Nations, and I see little merit in the impatience of those who would abandon this imperfect world instrument because they dislike our imperfect world. For the troubles
of a world organization merely reflect the troubles of the world
itseH.n
Outstanding among those who dislike our imperfect world are
the Marxist-Leninists. Their attitude toward the organization of
peace found most recent and authentic expression in the official
program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted at
the Twenty-Second Party Congress, October, 1961, in Moscow.
This program forms a lengthy and exhaustive document, which
has a great deal to say about the "world Socialist system» and the
strong desire of the Communist Party leaders to pursue a policy
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of "peaceful coexistence" to the end that this world system may be
rapidly developed and strengthened. But the program is strangely
vague concerning the details of its structure and processes. c'The
world Socialist system is a new type of economic and political
relationship between countries," the program asserts,-a cCsocioeconomic and political community of ·purpose." But how will this
cCcommunity" be organized? The program does not plainly say.
In fact the Soviet design of a world state leaves a great deal to
the imagination. Karl Marx's original idea seemed to be that a
dictatorship of the international proletariat would eventually put
an end to the need for organized political institutions and the state
would c'wither away". Under Lenin's more aggressive and vigorous
leadership of the international Communist movement the end of
the need for political institutions faded from view and the idea
that the state would wither away itself withered away. In its place
there has developed the idea of the Soviet world. state, "the most
extravagantly coercive, caste-ridden world state ever conceived in
the minds of men," as Elliott R. Goodman describes it in his illuminating book on the subject. Thus what we Americans like to call
the Free World is confronted by a Soviet Russian plan for a universal political order, or world state, deriving its claim to validity
from the patronage of a triumphant, as they think, international
Communist Party.
In the eyes of its votaries this Communist world state is no idle
dream of impractical visionaries. It is, they believe, the natural
and inevitable result of the operation of the basic economic forces
in the contemporary world. The destiny of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, as the Russian Communists see it, is to become
the vital center of an expanding system of Communist states until
the Communist world order embraces all mankind. Khrushchev
professes to have convinced himself that this Communist world
system can be realized without resort to international war as the
instrument of Communist foreign policy. This is the essence of
his recent devotion to the cause of "peaceful coexistence". (See
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Twelfth Report,
June 1960)
The Chinese Communists also presumably see something like
the Russian vision of a new world order. The idea of a world state
is certainly no radical novelty to the heirs of the Confucian political tradition. From the classical Chinese point of view the massive

and durable Celestial Empire was a universal political order, in
which there was room for any number of imperial 'provinces and
tributary kingdoms, but no comprehension of the sovereign equality of states as exhibited in the political system of the modem
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West. The Chinese Communist leaders, however, boasting the
superior purity of their brand of Marxism-Leninism, may question
the feasibility of achieving world-wide supremacy for their ideal
world order without resort to sanguinary wars against the "Free
World." It is "peaceful coexistence" prior to the achievement of the
Communist world order, rather than the ultimate world order
itself, that seems to them the visionary dream.
It "is not surprising that the Russian and Chinese Communists
should have difficulty in understanding one another. Karl Marx
himself, whatever may be the merits of his "dialectical materialism", regarded as a key to the interpretation of history, was grossly
misled concerning the history of China. In his early life he acted
for a time as a European correspondent for the N ew York Tribune.
An article of his, written in the 1850s amidst the great Taiping
rebellion, which then threatened to overthrow the Manchu Dy:.
nasty and restore the Empire on a more modern basis, forecast
the development of revolution in China in harmony with the
predicted course of the revolutionary movement in the West. (See
N. Y. Daily Tribune, June 14, 1853, p. 4) But the Taiping leaders,
though scoring sensational victories over the imperial forces,
proved incapable of u~ing to any good purpose the power which
they wrenched from th<i' feeble grasp of the Manchu rulers. The
Taiping, or "Great Peace", rebellion was eventually put down by
the Chinese themselves with an assist from the British and French.
The time came when Stalin was able to dabble actively in Chinese
revolutionary politics, but neither in his dealings with the Chinese
Nationalists under Sun Yat-sen nor in those with the Communists
under Mao Tse-tung did he show an intelligent grasp of the
Chinese situation. His eventual alliance with the latter was more
a marriage of convenience than an association based on a genuine
sense of community of purpose and principle.
Moreover, there is nothing in either dialectical materialism or
the Confucian tradition to determine whether the capital of the
new Marxist-Leninist world order should be "in Moscow or in
Peking. There is also nothing in either of these sys1tems of political
philosophy to determine which group of Communist politicians,
the Russian or the Chinese, possesses the better claim to the
leadership of the international Communist Party. A third of mankind may share the Marxist-Leninist vision of a Communist system
of world order, but happily for the other two-thirds the former do
not share a common plan for realizing their vision.
The response of the Free World to the challenge of the Communist vision is the organization of peace under the Charter of the
United Nations. The Russian and Chinese ideas of a universal
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political order, whatever the difficulties may be in the way of their
practical realization, constitute a powerful weapon in the present
contest for the mastery of men's minds. Only a better idea of the
form which a universal reign of law might take would be a more
powerful weapon. The essence of such an idea is embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations. The question remains: How serviceable can the United Nations be, regarded as an instrument of
the purposes and principles of those who wish to create the kind
of world order described in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter?
The practical importance of this question in the development of
American foreign policy has led to numerous appraisals of the past
success and future promise of the United Nations. Some of these
appraisals possess exceptional interest because of the i,m portance
of the persons who have made them. For instance, President
Eisenhower's Commission on National Goals devoted the second
part of its Report, published in 1960, to what it called «Goals
Abroad." Goal number 15 related to the United Nations. «A key
goal in the pursuit of a vigorous and effective United States
foreign policy," the Report declared, His the preservation and
strengthening of the United Nations. Over the next decade," the
Report continued, Hit will be under tremendous strain. Howev~r,
it remains the chief instrument available for building a genuine
community of nations."
Does this mean that building a genuine community of nations
is also a key goal of American foreign policy? The Report does not
clearly say. The Commission on National Goals did make some
significant observations concerning the United Nations. «It must
be recognized," the Report conceded, «that the United Nations
provides a forum for Soviet propaganda and tactics of dissension,
and an opportunity for Soviet vetoes to block or delay world advances. Nevertheless, we should give the world community, as
represented by the United Nations, our steadfast support." But, in
giving such support, what kind of organization for the world community is our national goal? What do we really wish to make out
of the United Nations? The Commission did not say.
The Rockefeller Panel Reports, published in 1961 under the
general title, «Prospect for America", proceed in a similar vein.
Report Number I, entitled HThe Mid-Century Challenge to American Foreign Policy," prepared by Panel I under the chairmanship
of Dean Rusk, now Secretary of State, is somewhat more specific.
«The United Nations," this Report declares, «is proof of our conviction, that problems which are of world-wide impact must be
dealt with through institutions global in their scope." The authors
of this Report presumably believed that the world community
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should possess an organization universal in membership and operation. But what needs to be done to enable the existing United
Nations Organization to fulfill its necessary and proper mission?
Rockefeller Panel Report Number I does not clearly answer this
question.
This Rockefeller Panel Report discusses the problem in an interesting and imaginative way, though the end of the discussion is
still inconclusive. uThe United Nations," it declares, ~~stands,
finally, as a symbol of th~ world order that will one day be built.
The United States has need of symbols as well as power in its
foreign policy." This is forthright as far as it goes, but it does not
go far enough. Cannot more be said now concerning the nature of
the world order that the Free World will one day build and of the
preparatory work that may be done in the immediate future?
A more recent appraisal of the United Nations, which gains
significance from the position of its author as well as from the
cogency of its argument, is that by the chairman of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, J. William Fulbright, published
in the October, 1961, issue of ~~Foreign Affairs" under the title,
"For a Concert of Free Nations". Senator Fulbright was an early
leader in the movement to put a stronger general international
organization in place of the defunct League of Nations and has
been a sturdy supporter of the United Nations through all its trials
and tribulations in the years since its foundation. Observing the
weakness of the United Nations, regarded as a peace-keeping
institution, in consequence of the failure of the super-powers to
collaborate in the Security Council in accordance with the hopes
of the founders, the Senator concludes that common fears of a
nuclear holocaust are not enough to ensure the success of a genuine system of collective security on a world-wide scale. There
must be, he believes, a more rational sense of community based
on voluntary and unconstrained acceptance of common purposes
and common principles. There must be, as he puts it, ~~a community rooted not only in common peril-but also in common values
and aspirations."
Senator Fulbright's analysis of the problem of establishing a
viable world order probes deeply into the nature of world politics.
"There is no necessary correlation," he declares, CCbetween human
need and human capacity." Successful political institutions require, he believes, ~~the positive force of a sense of community."

He is sanguine enough to observe that

~~a

genuine community is

painfully emerging in the Western world." He would make this
emerging community ua realistic concert of free nations." He does
not profess to know in precisely what form this "concert of free
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nations" should be organized. He does concede that the objective
of building a cohesive community of free nations "should be pursued as far as possible within the United Nations."
The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace agrees with
Senator Fulbright in emphasizing the importance of a sense of
community of purpose and of principle among those who would
build a durable and eHective system of peace-making and peacekeeping. It agrees also with his conclusion that the eHort to implement such a sense of community should be pursued as far as
possible within the United Nations. It is convinced further that
the most promising concert of free nations consists of those United
Nations Member States which are strongly committed to the purposes and principles set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the United
Nations Charter. But the Commission sees no advantage at this
time in trying to organize this particular community of free nations outside the United Nations Organization. On the contrary,
we believe, the greatest influence of this "concerf' can be expected
to develop under wise leadership within the General Assembly
and the Councils of that Organization.
The achievements of the United Nations Organization in its first
seventeen years have been radically diHerent from the expectations or hopes of the founders. Outstanding has been the development of a new and better system of tutelage for the states which
have sprung from the liquidation of obsolete colonial empires.
Colonialism proved to be a permanently unacceptable method of
applying the technical skills and free capital of the more advanced
societies to the_development of those less advanced in the 'use of
modern science and technology. Trusteeship under the United
Nations was a useful temporary aid in the adjustment of older
societies to modern conditions. Membership in the United Nations, however, on terms of political equality with the original
members clears the way for the most eHective utilization of
modern ideas and techniques.
Membership in the United Nations for these new states promises
enjoyment of the basic human ·rights and fundamental freedoms
which the Charter seeks to extend to all peoples everywhere
regardless of race, color, previous condition, or present lack of
military power. It does not guarantee immediate full enjoyment
of these rights and freedoms. But it does create better opportunities for their enjoyment with less risk of international conflict
than during the period when the Western nations themselves were
struggling to obtain these same rights and freedoms. This achievement means a better hope for all of maintaining a world environment in which free societies can prosper. It holds the promise of a
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firmer foundation for the further development of the United N ations Organization itself.
Another important achievement of the United Nations Organization has been the improvement of the facilities for the peaceful
settlement of international disputes. If the possibility of peaceful
change be, as John Foster Dulles intimated, the fundamental prerequisite for peace, then the developing practice of parliamentary
diplomacy offers the promise of a brighter future for the relations
between the powers. The Commission to Study the Organization
of Peace believes that the United Nations is already much more
than a symbol. The Commission believes that it is indeed a veritable power in world politics, and that there is useful work to be
done now in further developing the Organization to the end that
those international statesmen who speak in its name may exert an
even greater influence over the course of events. We Americans
have been strangely reluctant to profess our intention of establishing a more rational and more peaceful world order as the logical
as well as desirable culmination of the American way of life, but
the record of peaceful changes already promoted by various proceedings at the United Nations forbids ignoring the latent possi~
bilities in this field of world politics.
It is significant that most of the occasions on which the United
Nations has employed military forces or observers in its peacemaking or peace-keeping activities have arisen in connection with
the problems of newly liberated colonial dependencies. Korea,
Palestine, the Congo: all were situations in which the peace of the
world was threatened by the unwillingness or inability of newly
established authorities to keep their own peace. It is not necessary
to apportion the blame for these situations among the various
powers claiming an interest in them. It is enough that the situations grew out of operations concerned with the liquidation of
colonial empires. The greatest service of the United Nations Organization in the prevention of war up to now has been to prevent
war between major powers by stopping conHicts between lesser
peoples, with little or no experience as independent states, before
they could spread beyond their own borders.
If building a genuine community of nations is a key goal of
American foreign policy, the transformation of the United Nations
into a strong and universal organization, which can hold its place
at the vital center of the modern world, is an urgent task of statesmanship, especially American statesmanship. For peace, as President Kennedy said in his masterly address to the United Nations
General Assembly, September 25, 1961, C<:is not solely a matter of
military or technical problems-it is primarily a matter of politics
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and people. He continued to point out the right conclusions from
contemporary developments in the evolution of the United Nations in his State of the Union Address to the Congress on January
11, 1962. "We may not always agree with every detailed action
taken by every officer of the United Nations," he declared, "or with
every voting majority. But as an institution it should have in the
future, as it has had in the past since its inception, no stronger or
more faithful member than the United States of America."
11. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, therefore, recommends finally that the Free World support the further
development of the United Nations Organization in pursuit of a
goal in sharp contrast to the Communist vision of a system of
world order. We believe with President Kennedy that "in the development of this Organization rests the only true alternative to
war; and war appeals no longer as a rational alternative." The
general direction which the further development of the United
Nations Organization should take was carefully considered by the
Commission in its Fourteenth Report, published in January of this
year. We think that the Organization should be "a dynamic instrument of Governments," implementing the purposes and principles
set forth in the Charter. It should be made capable of serving
efficiently the kind of world described in Articles 1 and 2.
12. The C ommi~sion in its earlier reports has offered many
specific suggestions for the strengthening and further development
of the United Nations Organization. (See especially our Reports
numbered 10, 11, and 13.) It renews these recommendations here,
Weare convinced that a natural principle of the political order
calls for the establishment of a world-wide reign of law based on
the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations and realizable only through universal membership in the
United Nations.
The new view of this old American goal has been well expressed
in a recent address by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Speaking on
November 28, 1961 before the Academy of Political Science in
N ew York City, he said: "Our foreign policy is directed toward
building the kind of world community called for in the United
Nations Charter-a community of independent nations, each free
to work out its own institutions as it sees fit, but cooperating effectively in matters of common interest.'> He added: "We think of
'community> as the context within which men can join together
to build a more adequate home for the race within the physical
environment, and the context within which man must find an
answer to his propensity for self-extermination ... The President ·
has reminded us that 'there cannot be an American solution to
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every world problem.' The world community, which is a scarlet
thread of American policy, is a necessary goal for all nations who
wish to be both secure and free, whether allied or neutral, whether
Western or non-Western, and whatever their stage of economic
development. The building of that community is the main objective of man."
This, Secretary Rusk declared, "is no triVial goal." The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace agrees. And we suggest
that making the United Nations as nearly as practicable a universal organization is an important next step in the direction in
which all for whom Secretary Rusk spoke wish to go.
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Josephine W. Pomerance
James P. Pope
Charles C. Price
Leland Rex Robinson6
J. William Robinson

1. I could not support Recommendation 8 in its present form, whioh is
vague and liable to be misread. I could support a rewording along the
following lines:
The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recommends,
therefore, that the activities of the United Nations Organization and
its specialized agencies be extended vigorously in the preparation of
programs of internal improvements in underdeveloped Member States
and that the fullest use be made of the credit of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development in the money markets of the world.
]. B. Condliffe

2. With reservations on Recommendation No.3.
E. A. Conway, S.].

3. Does not agree with Recommendations Nos. 2, 4 and 11.
Ernst B. Haas

4. In view of recent developments in Southeast Asia, the India-Chinese
Territorial dispute, and ideological differences regarding the inevitability
of war, Communist China must have more time to display its attachment
to the principles of peace and to those of the United Nations Charter as
conditions for admission to the United Nations.
]. Eugene Harley

5. With reservations only as to the timing and the intent of applicants
for membership among the "divided" nations.
Anne Hartwell]ohnstone
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6. Immediate efforts are imperative toward some political modus vivendi
with the Peiping regime and the establishment of orderly contacts within or
through the United Nations and its associated bodies.
However, the two China concept approved in principle in this Fifteenth
Report spotlights several acute problems in whose resolution some progress
should be made before admission of the Mainland government becomes
feasible or desirable.
Among these are the open belligerence of Peiping and the occasional
bellicose utterances from high quarters in Taipei, -perhaps accentuated by
the obvious entanglement of military strategy and humanitarian considerations in our aid; the provincial, rather than national, status imposed upon
the people of Taiwan by the present set-up of the Nationalist Government,
and by the uncompromising attitude of Peiping; and the structure of the
Security Council after the proposed admission of the "Peoples Republic":
i.e. whether the peoples of China should then be represented by permanent
membership in the Council, and if so, by which "China."
In all this the wishes of the people of Formosa should be consulted, their
protection and development underscored, and continued priority given to
the build-up of political and economic standards offering potent competition
in an environment of peaceful coexistence.
At no point should any question be raised as to continued direct representation of Taiwan in the United Nations-a condition which the "Peoples
Republic" is not now prepared to accept. This -responsible participation
of the Nationalist Government, however, calls for far greater dedication to
the acceptance, care and resettlement of refugees from Mainland China
than has to this time characterized the Taiwan regime.
Leland Rex Robinson

7. With reservations on Recommendation No.3.
Francis O. Wilcox
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APPENDIX A
Legal Obstacles to Universal Membership
QUINCY WRIGHT

"Membership in the United Nations," according to Article 4 of
the Charter, "is open to all other peace-loving states which accept
the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these
obligations."
Thus, there are five qualifications: (1) that the applicant for
membership must be a state; (2) that it must be peace-loving;
(3) tha~ it must accept the obligations contained in the Charter;
( 4) that it must be able to carry out these obligations; and (5)
that it must be willing to carry them out. These are the only provisions in the Charter concerning eligibility for membership.
The authority to interpret these qualifications is specified only
with regard to the last two; they are to be interpreted by "the
judgment of the organization." It is not stated by what organ the
United Nations will express judgment, but since the Charter says
that "the admission of any such state to membership in the United
Nations will be affected by a decision of the General Assembly
upon the recommendation of the Security Council," it would appear that this judgment is to be expressed by these orgqns. Furthermore, it would seem that the interpretation of the first three
qualifications was intended to be made by judgment of the same
organs.
The International Court of Justice gave an Advisory Opinion in
1950 at the request of the General Assembly, to the effect that
members of the United Nations ought not to guide their judgment
when voting in these organs by qualifications other than those
explicitly mentioned in the Charter-particularly that they ought
not to utilize their·votes as an element in a bargain. The Opinion
was asked because the Soviet Union had stated explicitly that it
would not vote for the admission of Italy unless other states voted
for certain Soviet satellites. Since, as pointed out by some members of the Court, a state is under no obligation to express the
motives for its vote and there is no procedure for overriding its
vote, the qualifications can actually be no more than subjective or
moral limitations under member's political discretion when voting
in the General Assembly or the Security Council. It is olear that
a state excluded by a 'vote so taken cannot appeal to the Inter51

national Court of Justice and gain admission to the United Nations
on the ground that its admission had been prevented by an improperly motivated vote. Nor is there any procedure for declaring
that votes which have admitted a new member are void on the
ground that the state in question actually lacks the Charter qualifications. Indeed, it is clear that subsequent to this Advisory
Opinion of the Court, many states have become members of the
United Nations on the basis of votes motivated by political bargaining between the two sides in the Cold War. We must conclude
that when votes for a new member ignore the qualifications of the
Charter or are motivated by consideration not authorized in the
Charter, this does not reduce their effectiveness. The Charter
qualifications are merely appeals to the conscience or common
sense of the voting members.
In its Advisory Opinion the Court also dealt with procedural
matters, holding that a favorable Hdecision" of the General Assembly was not sufficient to confer membership unless there was also
favorable ~'recommendation" by the Security Council. This issue
had been controversial because an opinion of a committee at the
San Francisco Conference had taken the contrary view, that while
a recommendation of the Security Council must be given, the
General Assembly could admit a state even if the recommendation
were adverse .( 9th Report pp. 21-22). This Opinion of the Court
was important because it had been assumed that a "recommendation" of the Security Council on this matter would not be procedural but would constitute a substantive "decision," subject under
Article 27 of the Charter to veto by the permanent members. -Thus,
although not explicitly so provided in the Charter, the admission
of new members has been subject to great-power veto.
Leaving aside the lack of sanctions to enforce the Charter qualifications for membership, what do they mean?
1. What is a, state? International law recognizes the need for
both condition of fact-the independent governriient of a population inhabiting a defined territory; and a condition of law-general recognition of this fact of prolonged conscious acquiescence
in it by most existing states. The relative weights given to these
two aspects of statehood divide the advocates of the "declaratory"
and the Hconstitutive" theories of recognition. Both hold that some
recognition is necessary for an entity to be a state. A small community on a Pacific Island or a native chieftainship in Central New
Guinea, isolated from any contact with the states of the world,
would not under either theory be a state in the sense of existing
international law.
The advocates of the declaratory theory, however, hold that
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when a state exists in fact with some external contacts, it is a state
in the sense of international law and recognition is merely declaratory of that situation.
The advocates of the constitutive theory, on the other hand, hold
that, whatever the facts, recognition is essential, and is therefore
"constitutive" of statehood in the legal sense. Some, who take this
view, hold that recognition is a political act to be exercised at.
discretion, that states may use recognition or non-recognition as
instruments of policy, and that they may, therefore, refuse to
recognize a state or a government formed by revolution, even
when firmly established, and may continue to recognize the previous de iure government which may continue a ghostly existence
in exile. Some, on the other hand, though accepting the constitutive character of recognition, hold that it is a juristic act and that
states should, in general, recognize a de facto state or government,
or even, as maintained by the late Judge Lauterpacht, that they
are under a legal obligation to do so.
The United States rather consistently recognized de facto governments after President Washington recognized the revolutionary
government of France in 1793, although that government had
recently sent King Louis XVI, the ally of the United States, to
the guillotine and was considered by many conservatives in the
United States as dangerously radical. This policy was, however,
changed when President Wilson refused to recognize the de facto
Mexican government of Victoriano Huerta who had aohieved his
position by causing the assassination of his predecessor, President
Madero. De facto ism was in fact a major element of United States
policy set forth in the Monroe Doctrine, which warned the Euro. pean powers not to attempt to reestablish in Latin America the
authority of the de iure sovereign, the King of Spain.
Since 1913 the United States has pursued varying policies, often
refusing to recognize de facto governments over long periods because it did not like their ideology or their practices (as in the
cases of Soviet Russia and Communist China) or because it hoped
to reunite divided states such as Germany, Korea and Vietnam.
Such refusals to recognize, from considerations of national policy,
are to be distinguished from the non-recognition of new states
arising from territorial transfers effected by the use of armed force
in violation of int~rnational obligations. This principle was asserted by Secretary Stimson after Japan's conquest of Manchuria
in 1931, and was supported by both the League of Nations and
the United Nations. It was followed in regard to Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia and Hitler's conquest in Europe. Such departures from de facto ism, whether on grounds of policy or principle,
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should be distinguished from non-recognitions arising from genuine doubt as to whether a state or government is actually established with sufficient material power, stable boundaries and moral
support or acquiescence of its population to make it a state in fact.
Doubtless there is always justification in delaying recognition of a
revolutionary government until sufficient time has passed to make
its continuance highly probable; but when that probability exists,
it would appear that recognition makes for stability and accord
with international law provided that change has not resulted from
external aggression. Even in the latter case, it would seem that the
United Nations might eventually recommend recognition of the
change if it deemed it on the whole beneficial. As Judge Lauterpacht suggested, there must be a method for balancing the principle jus ex injuria non oritur with the principle ex facto jus oritur.
Non-recognition of a well-established state or government usually amounts to a denial of the right of the people concerned to
choose their own government and to a c9ndemnation of a state's
attitude in international relations without a hearing. Non-recognition in such circumstances, therefore, seems contrary to the basic
democratic principle that government should exist by the consent
of the governed and to the basic principle of justice that no one
shall be condemned without a hearing.
The United Nations should observe the same principles, particularly because-as Secretary-General Trygve Lie pointed out in
the spring of 1950 when urging the representation of Mainland
China-a member of the United Nations cannot meet its responsibilities under the Charter unless the government which represents
it actually controls the territory of the state. Furthermore the
United Nations cannot adequately perform its functions unless all
existing states are members.
2. What is the meaning of cCpeace-loving'? The Charter makes
it clear that this phrase referred to states which had been at war
against the Axis powers. Article 3 says, ccThe original members
of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, sign the present
Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110." The Declaration of January 1, 1942 was signed by the states at war with one
or more of the Axis powers. Under the Yalta agreement only states
which had signed this declaration were invited to the San Francisco Conference. Article 4 of the Charter implies that these
original members were cCpeace-Ioving states" by saying that cCother
peace-loving states" are eligible to membership.
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To have recently been at war is an unusual conception of the
term "peace-loving" but in view of the charges and countercharges of aggression made during the Cold War, it is difficult to
reach agreement as to a definition. Each side, in charging the other
with warlike propensities, has declared its own allegiance to the
cause of peace. Nearly all states have participated in war in the
past, more or less recently, more or less frequently. All regard their
rivals of the moment as being belligerent and all regard themselves as champions of peace. Since the first purpose of the United
Nations is to maintain international peace and security, it should
perhaps be sufficient to ascribe a peace-loving character to any
state which applies for membership in the United Nations and
thus formally endorses this purpose.
3. H ow can it be 'determined that a state accepts the obligations of the Charter? This phrase would in international law be
assumed to refer to formal acceptance by the usual procedures of
signature and ratification by the state>s duly constituted authorities. It is difficult to think of any other applicable conception.
States have not, it is true, always observed treaties which they
have accepted by such formal process. There is even evidence that
on occasion states have formally accepted instruments when their
governments had no real intention of observing them. Interriationallaw recognizes that formal acceptance resulting froIl} duress
or fraud against the negotiator is not a real acceptance and renders
the instrument voidable. The Stimson Doctrine goes further, asserting that duress against the state itself, as when it has been
defeated in war, invalidates its formal acceptance of a treaty. It
is unlikely, however, that either a government or a state will be
coerced by force or deception to apply for membership in the
United Nations and formally to accept the Charter. We must,
therefore, assume that a state which has ratified the Charter by its
constitutional procedure has "accepted" it in the sense of the
Charter.
4. When is a state able to carry out the obligations of the
Charter? Fulfillment of United Nations obligations involves three
kinds of acts:
First: Action in the state's territory or in its ships, aircraft or
space satellites necessary to carry o-qt obligations such as those to
promote respect for human rights and the self -determination of
peoples, and to promote social and economic progress in accord
with United Nations principles and special treaties to which it is
a party. Also in this category are obligations to see that ships, aircraft and space satellites for which it is responsible observe international law. This may require positive action in enforcing law
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within the State's territory and regulating its public services, or it
may require abstention from such action as to infringe the human
rights of its nationals and of aliens resident in its territory. Such
capability is implied by the factual aspects of the definition of a
state. An entity, as noted, is not a state unless a population inhabiting a defined territory is in fact controlled by an independent
government. There has, of course, been great variation in the
efficiency of government and all governments have at times been
the victims of insurrection or rebellion temporarily preventing
the exercise of authority in a part, or even the whole, of the state's
territory. It would appear, however, that if an entity is judged to
be a state and is represented by its de facto government, it can
be assumed that the government is able to fulfill its obligations
in its territory, its ships, aircraft, and space satellites. This, of
course, would not be true of members which are represented by
governments which do not in fact control the state's territory.
Second, there are the negative obligations in international relations such as to refrain from threat or use of force (Art. 2, par. 4)
except in individual or collective self-defense against armed attack
(Art. 51); from intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of other
states or from violation of their territorial integrity or political
independence (Art. 2, pars. 1, 4, 7); from assistance to a state
found by the United Nations to be an aggressor (Art. 2, par. 5);
or from attempting to influence the international character of the
Secretary-General or the staff (Art. 100). Observance of such
duties of abstention depends upon good faith (Art. 2, par. 2) .in
the highest decision-making authority and proper instruction of
lesser officials. All states have the ability to fulfill obligations of
this type if they have the will.
The third type of action required is that necessary to fulfill positive obligations for settling disputes peacefully, for supporting the
United Nations as an organization, and for assisting it in collective security and other operations in foreign territory in fulfilment
of its purposes and responsibilities. These obligations are of three
types, financial, civil and military. The Charter authorizes the
General Assembly to approve the budget and to apportion it
among the members (Art. 17) and payment of the amount apportioned is an obligation sanctioned by suspension of voting privileges (Art. 19). This applies only to the regular budget. Extraordinary expenses as for refugees, economic assistance, and policing
activities, not made part of the regular budget (as were the Congo
operations), are sustained by voluntary contributions.
While it is conceivable that the General Assembly might so appI:ove and apportion a budget as to impose financial obligations
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upon certain members beyond their capacity to pay, no such
danger has appeared on the horizon. The regular budget of the
United Nations has been less than one-tenth of one per cent of
the total governmental expenditures of the members and the apportionment has been' carefully geared to the capacity of the members. They vary from one-third paid by the United States to a
fraction of one per cent paid by the smaller states. While there
have been delinquencies in payment, these have been due to delay
in legi~lative appropriations, to temporary financial difficulties,
which the General Assembly considers before imposing sanctions
(Art. 19) or to political opposition to the purpose of the appropriati.on as by the Soviet Union and France in refusing to pay their
apportionments for the United Nations Force in the Congo in

1961.
The members are expected to send representatives to the meetings of United Nations organs and this is made an explicit obligation of members of the .security Council. To facilitate prompt
meetings "each member of the Security Council shaH for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization."
(Art. 28). On several occasions members have failed to observe
this obligation by absenting themselves for longer or shorter periods from Security Council meetings. Members are expected to
permit the Secretary-General to recruit his staff from among their
.nationals but the only obligation of members in respect to the Secretary-General and staff is the negative one already referred
to (Art. 100). While members are obliged to settle disputes by
peaceful means (Art. 2, par. 3) and to utilize United Nations procedures to this end, none of these procedures, except for states
which have accepted the optional clause of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, goes beyond recommendation,
carrying out of which is voluntary. The obligation, therefore, is
to bargain in good faith coupled with the negative obligation to
refrain from nonpacific means of settlement. Participation by
members in civil and military operations of the United Nations
in foreign territory is voluntary.
Each member, while under a general obligation to assist the
United Nations in collective security operations (Art. 2, par. 5)
and to carry out decisions of the Security Council (Arts. 25, 48,
49) is free to specify the forces it will contribute to such enterprises by prior agreement as provided in Articles 43 and 45 of the
Charter or by ad hoc contributions of forces as by certain states
in the Palestine, Korean, Suez and Congo operations. No state can
be required to contribute beyond its own estimate of its ability.
It therefore appears that insofar as the members of the United
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Nations are states represented by their governments, they can be
assumed to be able to carry out United Nations obligations. There
are, doubtless, present members which do not entirely conform to
these conditions, as, for example, the Ukraine and Byelorussia
which, as members of the Soviet Union, lack independent authority over their territories; or China which is represented by a
government that controls little, if indeed any, Chinese territory.
5. When is a state willing to carry out its obligations? This
qualification adds little, if anything, to the requirements that an
applicant must accept the obligations of the Charter. No test of
willingness to fulfill obligations beyond formal affirmation of SJ.lch
willingness by ratifying the Charter is available. An inquiry into
the motivation of the various persons taking part in the treatymaking process would not be feasible.
It would thus appear that any state which, by applying for
membership, indicates its readiness to ratify the Charter, can be
deemed peace-loving and able and willing to carry out Charter
obligations. The only issue on which judgments may properly
differ is whether the applicant is really a state. To determine this
it is relevant to consider such questions as the habitual authority
of the government over its population, the degree of popular support for or acquiescence in this government, the definition of the
boundaries of its territory, the efficiency of its legal and administrative system in maintaining order, prevailing conceptions of
justice, the stability and adequacy of its economy to sustain its
population, and the extent and peaceful character of its foreign
relations.
Thus I come to the considered conclusion that there are no legal
obstacles to admitting all genuine states to the United Nations.
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APPENDIX B
The following table shows the distribution of votes in the Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations on some leading
roll-calls in which the United States and the Soviet Union voted
on opposite sides. It is designed to illustrate some political traits
of the underdeveloped Member States.-The Member States in the
first class are those of advanced industrialization and/ or high
production per capita. The second class contains Member States
occupying an intermediate position in the scale of economic development. The underdeveloped Member States are distributed
among the principal geographic regions and are listed according
to the rate of contributions to the revenues of the UN Organization. In general the Member States classified as underdeveloped
report an annual production of less than $S.OO per capita. Many
of them produce less than $1.00 per capita per annum. The classification is based on findings of the United Nations Special Fund
and of the Committee on Contributions.
The roll-calls took place on December 15, 1961, December 20,
1961, and January SO, 1962, respectively. The first was on a Resolution to seat representatives of Communist China in the United
Nations, which was strongly supported by the Soviet Union; the
second, on a Resolution to authorize the United Nations to borrow
two hundred million dollars, strongly supported by the United
States; the third, on a Resolution relating to the problem of
Angola, strongly supported by the Soviet Union. The first and
third of these Resolutions were defeated; the second was adopted.
RATE OF
ASSESSMENT

POPULATION
DATE OF
(MILLIONS) ADMISSION

RESOLUTIONS

1
2
3
I. INDUSTRIALIZED ~~HIGH-PRODUCTION" MEMBER STATES (16)
32.02
N
1. United States
179.0
1945
Y
N
210.0
14.97
1945
Y
2. Soviet Union
N
Y
41.9
3. Ukraine
1.98
1945
Y
N
Y
.52
8.1
4. Byelorussia
1945
Y
N
Y
52.1
7.58
1945
5. United Kingdom
Y
Y
N
5.94
45.0
6. France
1945
N
N
N
3.12
17.4
1945
N
7. Canada
Y
N
1.66
10.0
N
8. Australia
1945
N
Y
1.30
7.4
1946
Y
9. Sweden
Y
N
1.20
10. Belgium
9.1
1945
N
N
N
11. Czechoslovakia
1.17
13.5
1945
Y
N
Y
11.3
1945
A
12. Netherlands
1.01
Y
N
.58
4.5
1945
Y
13. Denmark
Y
N
.45
3.5
1945
14. Norway
Y
Y
N
2.3
15. New Zealand
.41
1945
N
N
Y
.05
0.32
1945
N
Y
16. Luxembourg
N
NAME OF STATE

Totals

73.96

8/ 7/ 1
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10/ 6/ 0

4/12 / 0

RATE OF
POPULATION DATE OF
RESOLUTIONS
NAME OF STATE
ASSESSMENT (MILLIONS) ADMISSION
1
2
II. INTERMEDIATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (17)
2.27
92.7
1956
N
Y
1. Japan
2. Italy
2.24
49.0
Y
N
1955
3. Poland
1.28
29.2
Y
1945
N
4. Argentina
1.01
20.6
1945
N
Y
N
.86
A
29.9
1955
5. itain
.56
Y
N
9.9
1955
6. untary
N
7. Sout Mrica
A
.53
14.4
1945
N
8. Venezuela
.52
6.5
Y
1945
9. Austria
.45
7.0
Y
A
1955
10. Finland
.37
4.4
Y
1955
Y
11. Chile
.26
7.5
1945
N
Y
12. Cuba
.22
Y
N
6.6
1945
13. Israel
.15
2.0
A
1949
Y
14. Ireland
.14
2.8
N
Y
1955
15. Uruguay
N
.11
2.7
1945
A
16. Lebanon
Y
A
.05
1.5
1945
17. Iceland
.04
0.17
1946
A
Y
Totals

11.06

4/9/4

11/3/3

III. UNDERDEVELOPED MEMBER STATES (71)
A. EASTERN AND SOUTHERN ASIA (13)
4.57
1945
N
A
1. China
Taiwan
10.2
Mainland
669.
2. India
2.03
402.
1945
Y
A
3. Indonesia
.45
90.3
1950
Y
Y
4. Pakistan
.42
86.8
1947
Y
Y
N
5. Phillippines
.40
24:7
1945
A
6. Thailand
.16
21.8
1946
N
Y
.13
6.7
N
7. Malaya
1957
Y
.09
9.6
Y
8. Ceylon
1955
Y
20.4
9. Burma
.07
1948
Y
Y
.04
4.8
1955
10. Cambodia
Y
A
.04
11. Laos
1.7
N
1955
Y
.04
9.0
12. Nepal
Y
1955
Y
13. Mongolia 1
1.06
1961
Y
N
Totals
B. LATIN AMERICA (15)
1. Brazil
2. Mexico
3. Colombia
4. Peru
5. Ecuador
6. Dominican
Republic
7. Guatemala
8. Bolivia
9. Costa Rica
10. EI Salvador
11. Haiti
12. Honduras
13. Nicaragua
14. Panama
15. Paraguay
Totals
1

8.44

8/5/0

8/1/4

3

N
N
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
Y
A
N
N
A
A
3/11/3

N
Y
Y
A
N
N
A
A
A
A
A
A
Y

3/3/7

1.03
.74
.26
.10
.06

64.2
33.3
13.8
10.5
4.1

1945
1945
1945
1945
1945

N
N
N
N
N

A
A
Y
Y
A

N
N
N
N
N

.05
.05
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04

2.9
3.6
3.4
1.1
2.5
3.4
1.9
1.4
1.0
1.7

1945
1945
1945
1945
1945
1945
1945
1945
1945
1945

N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

A
Y
Y
A
A
A
A
Y
Y

N
N
A
N
N
N
N
N
N

N

Y

N

2.61

0/15/0

Scale of assessment for Member States admitted by Sixteeuth General
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~ssembly

7/0/8

not yet determined.

0/14/1

RATE OF
POPULATION DATE OF
NAME OF STATE
ASSESSMENT (MILLIONS) ADMISSION
C. SOUTHWESTERN ASIA AND NORTHERN AFRICA (12)

I

2

3

.40

27.8

1945

N

Y

N

.30
.20
.14
.09

25.4
20.1
10.5
6.9
4.5
6.0
13.0
3.9
1.6
1.1
4.5

1945
1945
1956
1945
1945
1945
1946
1956
1955
1955
1947

Y
N
Y
Y
Y
A
Y
A
N
N
Y

A
Y
Y
A
A
A
A
Y
A
A
A

Y
N
Y
Y

4/0/8

3/2/7

Y
N
A
N
A
N
Y

Y
Y
N
Y
A
Y
A

I. Turk1

2. Unite Arab 2
Republic
Iran
Morocco
Iraq
Syria
Saudi Arabia
Afghanistan
Tunisia
Jordan
II. Libya
12. Yemen

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Totals
D. EUROPE (7)
I. Yugoslavia
2. Romania
3. Greece
4. Bulgaria
5. Portugal
6. Albania
7. Cyprus

.07
.05
.05
.04
.04
.04
1.42
.38
.32
.23
.20
.16
.04
.04

Totals
E. TROPICAL AFRICA (24)
I. Nigeria
2. Ghana
3. Congo (Leopoldville)
4. Sudan
5. Ethiopia
6. Senegal
7. Cameroun
8. Central African
Rep.
9. Chad
10. Congo (Brazzaville)
II. Dahomey
12. Gabon
13. Guinea
14. Ivory Coast
15. Liberia
16. Madagascar
17. Mali
18. Niger
19. Somalia
20. Togo
21. ~per Valta
22. auritania 1
23. Sierra Leone 1
24. Tanganyika 1
Totals

RESOLUTIONS

6/4/2
18.4
18.2
8.2
7.8
9.0
1.5
0.56

1945
1955
1945
1955
1955
1955
1960

1.37

Y
Y
N
Y
A
Y
A

4/1/2

2/3/2

A
A
A
A
A
A
A

4/1/2

.21
.09

33.7
6.7

1960
1957

A
Y

Y
Y

A
Y

.07
.07
.05
.05
.04

13.8
11.4
21.8
2.3
3.2

1960
1956
1945
1960
1960

A
Y
Y
N
N

A
A
Y
Y
Y

A
Y
Y
Y
Y

.04
.04

1.2
2.6

1960
1960

A
A

A
Y

A
A

.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.04

0.8
1.7
0.4
2.7
3.1
1.2
5.2
4.3
2.5
2.0
1.1
3.5
0.73
2.4
9.08

1960
1960
1960
1958
1960
1945
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1960
1961
1961
1961

A
A
N

A
A
A
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
A
Y
Y
Y
A

A
A
A
Y
A
A
A
Y
A
Y
A
A
A
A
Y

1.14

Y
A
N
N
Y
A
Y
A
A
N
Y
N

7/7/10

16/0/8

9/0/15

Y-Yes

N-No
A 1
2

absent or abstain

Scale of assessment for Member States admitted by Sixteenth General Assembly Dot yet determined.
Allocation between Syria and United Arab Republic to be determined.
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Previous Reports of the Commission to Study the
Organization of Peace*

Seventh Report-Collective Security under the United Nations,
July 1951.
Eighth Report-Regional Arrangements for Security and the
United Nations and Papers Presented to the Commission,
June 1953.
Ninth Report-Charter Review Conference and Papers Presented
to the Commission, August 1955.
Tenth Report-Strengthening the United Nations, Harper &
Brothers, October 1957.
Eleventh Report-Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age, New
York University Press, September 1959.
Twelfth Report-Peaceful Coexistence-A New Challenge to the
United Nations, June 1960.
Thirteenth Report-Developing the United N ations-A Response
to the Challenge of a Revolutionary Era, January 1961.
Fourteenth Report-The UN Secretary-General-His Role in
World Politics, January 1962.

o

The early Reports are no longer available.

